Serbs as victims : genocide in the rhetoric of Slobodan Miloševiæ by Staveland, Lars Inge
Serbs as Victims 
Genocide in the Rhetoric of Slobodan Miloševi 
Lars Inge Staveland 
 
Master thesis in history 
Department of Archeology, Conservation and Historical studies 
UNIVERSITY OF OSLO 
Autumn, 2007 
  
II 
  
III 
Acknowledgements 
 
 
Every decade a few individuals emerge on top the list of authoritarian leaders who set in 
motion vicious crimes against their own people. Their brutal regimes bring international 
condemnation, but they are only rarely forced from power. It is fair to say that a 
fascination with the behaviour of authoritarian rulers inspired this thesis. 
 
Slobodan Miloševi has already found his way into the world’s history books as the man 
most responsible for the worst conflict in Europe since the Second World War. He was 
also the only communist leader to end up in front of an international court, where he died 
in 2006. I found Miloševi an obvious choice for study, and I enthusiastically embarked 
on a Serbian language course to make this possible.  
 
There are many miles to cover in order to make a fascination into a master thesis.  
This project would not have been completed without valuable help, inspiring words and 
patience from friends and colleagues in Norway and abroad.  
 
The idea of focusing on Slobodan Miloševi’s speeches dawned on me during a trip to 
Belgrade. I am grateful to the staff at the Medija Centar and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 
in Belgrade who steered me in the right direction to literature not available in Oslo. 
Special thanks to Professor Ljubisa Raji at the University of Belgrade for his advice in 
the initial stages of this study.  
 
I am grateful to my supervisors, Professors Åsmund Egge and Svein Mønnesland for 
their guidance and help over these years. Also, thanks to Amar anovi for reviewing my 
translations. 
 
Oslo, November 2007. 
  
IV 
 
Contents 
 
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................................... III 
Cast of characters......................................................................................................................................VI 
Glossary................................................................................................................................................... VII 
Chronology of events.............................................................................................................................. VIII 
Introduction....................................................................................................................... 1 
Research questions ..................................................................................................................................... 2 
Thesis outline.............................................................................................................................................. 3 
Clarification of concepts ............................................................................................................................ 3 
Delimitations .............................................................................................................................................. 4 
Previous research....................................................................................................................................... 4 
Sources ....................................................................................................................................................... 7 
Theory and methodology ............................................................................................................................ 8 
1:  Genocide à la Serbia – historical background ........................................................ 13 
The myth of Kosovo .................................................................................................................................. 14 
Croatia in the Second World War ............................................................................................................ 16 
Cultural re-orientation in Serbia.............................................................................................................. 19 
Miloševi’s “revolution”.......................................................................................................................... 21 
What happens now?.................................................................................................................................. 22 
Summary................................................................................................................................................... 25 
2: Let the wars begin ...................................................................................................... 26 
In control of the press............................................................................................................................... 26 
Belgrade’s friends in Croatia. .................................................................................................................. 29 
The threat from the streets........................................................................................................................ 30 
Summary................................................................................................................................................... 32 
3: Selling the war on the home front ............................................................................. 33 
Confronting critics at home...................................................................................................................... 34 
Yugoslavia – not Greater Serbia .............................................................................................................. 35 
The ghost of genocide............................................................................................................................... 38 
Summary................................................................................................................................................... 46 
4: Bosnia - en route to genocide ..................................................................................... 47 
Genocide in Bosnia................................................................................................................................... 52 
The Islamist threat.................................................................................................................................... 55 
Trouble at home........................................................................................................................................ 57 
Summary................................................................................................................................................... 58 
5: Miloševi in denial ...................................................................................................... 59 
The peacemaker........................................................................................................................................ 60 
  
V 
Victims of foreign propaganda ................................................................................................................. 62 
The UN against Serbia ............................................................................................................................. 64 
Reaching out to Muslims .......................................................................................................................... 65 
Addressing the nation ............................................................................................................................... 68 
Elections at home ..................................................................................................................................... 71 
Summary................................................................................................................................................... 73 
6: Breaking with the Bosnian Serbs .............................................................................. 74 
Ditching Miloševi’s peace ...................................................................................................................... 75 
Protector of national interests .................................................................................................................. 77 
Genocidal sanctions ................................................................................................................................. 80 
The final break.......................................................................................................................................... 81 
End game.................................................................................................................................................. 83 
Summary................................................................................................................................................... 84 
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 85 
Bibliography .................................................................................................................... 90 
Primary sources: ...................................................................................................................................... 90 
Secondary sources:................................................................................................................................... 94 
 
  
VI 
 
Cast of characters 
 
Avramov, Smilja Serbian law professor and special advisor for Slobodan Miloševi.  
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Djodan, Šime  Extremist Croatian nationalist.  
Dobrica, osi  Serbian author and former head of the Serbian Academy of Arts and 
Sciences.  
Draškovi, Vuk  Opposition leader in Serbia. Nationalist, and leader of the Serbian 
Renewal Party, SPO.  
Gutman, Roy   Journalist, Newsday. 
Izetbegovi, Alija Devout Muslim led who became leader of the Party for Democratic 
Action, and president of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Karadži, Radovan Serbian psychiatrist and nationalist. President of Republika Srpska.  
Kaufman, Michael Journalist, New York Times.  
Koovi, Bogoljub Serbian demographer, and author of a controversial study of the number 
of Yugoslav casualties during the Second World War. 
Krajisnik, Momilo  Vice-president of Republika Srpska. 
Kukanja, Milutin  JNA general with responsibility for Sarajevo.  
Markovi, Ante Yugoslavia’s last Federal Prime Minister. Introduced popular economic 
reforms, but marginalised by Miloševi.  
Miloševi, Slobodan Serb politician and banker who rose to become Serbia’s undisputed 
leader. The most powerful figure on the Balkans during the wars in the 
1990s. Died in 2006. 
Mladi, Ratko   Leader of the Bosnian Serb armed forces.   
Okun, Herbert   Former US ambassador to Yugoslavia.  
Pani, Milan Serbian businessman who returned to Serbia to challenge Miloševi in 
1992. 
Plavši, Biljana Vice-president of Republika Srpska, and a member of the Bosnian 
presidency before the outbreak of war.  
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Raškovi, Jovan Moderate founder of the Serbian Democratic Party in Croatia.  
Raznjatovi, Željko  Serb paramilitary leader better known as Arkan.  
Stoltenberg, Thorvald Former Norwegian foreign minister who succeeded Cyrus Vance as Co-
Chairman of the International Committee for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICFY). Also head of UN forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Šešelj, Vojislav Extreme nationalist leader of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS).  
Tuman, Franjo Former army officer, and the first president of independent Croatia. 
Van den Broek, Hans Dutch foreign minister, and member of an EU team of negotiators.   
Vance, Cyrus UN representative as Co-Chairman of the International Committee for 
the former Yugoslavia (ICFY).  
Žerjavi, Vladimir Croatian demographer, and author of a controversial study on the 
number of war deaths in Yugoslavia during the Second World War. 1   
Glossary 
 
DCR  Documentacioni centar Ratovi 1991-1999 (War Documentation Centre). 
EC  European Community (European Union after the name change in 1994). 
HDZ   Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica (Croatian Democratic Community). 
ICFY  International Committee for the Former Yugoslavia.  
ICRC  International Committee for the Red Cross/Red Crescent.  
ICTY  International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.  
JNA  Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija (Yugoslav People’s Army). 
NBS  Narodna biblioteka Srbije (National Library of Serbia, Belgrade). 
NDH  Nezavisna Država Hrvatska (Independent State of Croatia). 
RS  Republika Srpska (Self-proclaimed Serbian republic in Bosnia-Herzegovina). 
RSK  Republika Srpska Krajina (Republic of Serb Krajina). 
RTB  Radio-Televizija Beograd.  
RTS  Radio-Televizija Srbija (Serbian Radio-Television, formerly RTB). 
SAO  Serbian Autonomous Oblast (District).  
SANU  Srpska Akademija Nauka i Umetnosti (Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences). 
SDA  Stranka Demokratska Akcije (Party of Democratic Action).  
SDS  Srpska Demokratska Stranka (Serb Democratic Party), in RS and RSK. 
SFRY  Socialistika Federativna Republika Jugoslavija (Socialist Federal Republic of 
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Yugoslavia). 
SPO  Srpski Pokret Obnove (Serb renewal movement), leading opposition party in Serbia.  
SPS  Socialistika Partija Srbije (Socialist party of Serbia). Slobodan Miloševi’s party. 
SRS  Srpska Radikalna Stranka (Serbian Radical Party), nationalist opposition party in Serbia.  
UN  United Nations. 
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.  
UNPROFOR United Nations Protections Force. Peace keeping force between 1992 in 1995. 
VJ  Vojska Jugoslavije (Army of Yugoslavia). 2   
Chronology of events 
1991: 
March 9 Thousands of demonstrators took to the streets in Belgrade. Miloševi warned against 
“stirring up discord and conflict”.3  
 
March 25  Slobodan Miloševi and Franjo Tudjman met in Karadjordjevo to discuss the partition 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
 
July 7 Miloševi mobilised the masses to “defend peace” in Croatia.4  
 
December 10 50 years anniversary for the start of the Serbian uprising against fascism during the 
Second World War. Miloševi warned that the “ghost of fascism is knocking on our 
door”. 5 
 
December 20 Bosnian presidency voted to seek independence, against the votes of the Serb 
representatives.  
 
December  The Vance plan negotiated, ending the war in Croatia. UNPROFOR established.  
1992:  
January 9 Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Republika Srpska (RS), declared. 
 
February 27  Miloševi defined three aims for his government: Security for Serbian people who 
live outside Serbia, preservation of Yugoslavia, and a peaceful solution to the 
Yugoslav crisis.   
 
March 1 Overwhelming support for independence for Bosnia-Herzegovina in a referendum 
boycotted by most Bosnian Serbs. 
 
March 3 Alija Izetbegovi declared independence. Ratified by Parliament in absence of its Serb 
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members the same night. 
. 
April 2 - 3  The first massacres in the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina carried out by Serb 
paramilitaries in Bijeljina.  
 
April 6 - 7 EC and US granted recognition to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Fighting started in Sarajevo.  
 
May 2 Bosnian Serb forces invaded Eastern Bosnia. 
 
May 27 More than 20 civilians died when a shell hit a Sarajevo bred queue. 
 
May 30  UN Security Council adopted resolution 757, imposing trade sanctions on Yugoslavia. 
 
October 9 Miloševi pledged not to cut off aid to the Bosnian Serbs in a TV interview.  
 
1993: 
February 20 Miloševi called the UN sanctions “genocidal measures” in an interview with the 
Russian newspaper Pravda.6   
 
April Miloševi signed the Vance-Owen peace plan.  
 
May 1 - 2 Conference in Thessaloniki, Greece. Radovan Karadži signed the plan on the 
condition that the Bosnian Serb assembly in Pale, Bosnia-Herzegovina, ratified it. 
Days later, the plan was rejected. 
  
May 6 Statement from the Serbian government cutting off shipments of money, fuel and 
industrial material to Republika Srpska. The boycott only lasted a few days.  
 
November 29 Miloševi said that the international community waged a war against three million 
Serbian children, through “genocidal sanctions”.7  
 
1994: 
Late January 1994 US Senate approves amendment to the State Department Authorization Bill which 
urged President to lift the arms embargo. 
 
February 5 69 civilians died in Markale shelling. 
 
February 17 Russian President Boris Yeltsin urges Karadži to pull back their heavy weapons, and 
promised to send Russian troops to areas from where the Bosnian Serbs had 
withdrawn. Offer accepted and crisis defused. 
 
July Bosnian Serbs rejected the Contact Group peace plan. Miloševi turned on the 
Bosnian Serb leaders and calls for a blockade.  
1995: 
July  Over 7,000 Bosnian Muslims massacred in Srebrenica.  
August Croatian forces overran Krajina, forcing 200,000 Serbs to flee.  
December 14 Dayton peace agreement signed in Paris, ending the Bosnian war.   
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Introduction 
The early 1990s saw the re-emergence of the word genocide on the public arena in 
Europe. Journalists who covered the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 
documented massacres of civilians unseen in Europe since the Second World War. The 
International Criminal Tribunal (ICTY) brought charges of genocide against several 
wartime leaders for the Former Yugoslavia. This thesis approaches the wars of 
independence in the former Yugoslavia from a Serbian genocide perspective. A national 
trauma involving a legacy of suffering and threats against Serbia and the Serbs 
constituted a genocide legacy in Serbia. This thesis looks at how this legacy was lifted 
from its place in Serbian history, and into a political context. More precisely, it looks at 
how the use of genocide featured in the speeches and public addresses made by Serbian 
president, Slobodan Miloševi.  
As the region approached war in the early 1990s, the legacy of genocide was used to 
mobilise the Serbian people to the fighting in Croatia. If an enemy’s intentions were 
described as genocidal, it also made it crucially important to follow the regime’s lead in 
destroying the chosen adversary. However, mobilisation for war only formed a limited 
part of Miloševi’s use of genocide in his rhetoric. The thesis statement concludes that 
Miloševi’s references to genocide were not confined to a threat defined by ethnicity. As 
such, this analysis challenges the view that he concentrated his propaganda on stirring up 
primordial ethnic hostilities.8 It is more accurate to say that genocide was used to promote 
Miloševi’s shifting interests. 
An analysis of the legacy of genocide in the rhetoric of Miloševi can shed new light on 
the underlying factors in the run-up to the war. Moreover, it can contribute to a wider 
analysis of Miloševi’s intentions, which his propaganda served to promote. This thesis  
argues that Miloševi in fact used the term as he saw it fit. By labelling an enemy’s 
motives as genocidal, he could mobilise his people to the war in Croatia. Furthermore, he 
could label his opponents at home as de facto accomplices to genocide, by refusing to 
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support his chosen path against an enemy with genocidal intentions. Miloševi denied 
any claims that his actions on the ground in Croatia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina were 
tailored towards creating a Greater Serbia. Instead he insisted that his goal was to  
preserve Yugoslavia. During the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Miloševi publicly 
presented himself as an observer to the conflict, but continued his genocide rhetoric. This 
time, however, the international community was labelled as perpetrator. As such, this 
thesis shows how the propaganda appeared disconnected, and in some cases contradictory 
to, the acts of war carried out by the national group he claimed to represent.  
Research questions 
This thesis reflects on the following questions:  
How was the  concept of genocide lifted from its place in Serbian history and into 
Slobodan Miloševi’s propaganda during the wars in Croatia and in Bosnia-
Herzegovina?  
This will be answered by isolating references to genocide in the select speeches, and by 
analysing the context in which the speeches were given.  
To what extent was the legacy of genocide aimed at mobilising the Serbs against an 
ethnic enemy with genocidal motives in the wars? 
This question is particularly relevant to the case of Croatia, where references to the 
Second World War formed part of the rhetoric aimed at mobilising Serbs to the war in 
Croatia.   
What role did the references to genocide play when Miloševi attempted to rebrand 
himself as a peacemaker during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina? 
From 1992, it is possible to detect a shift in Miloševi’s rhetoric when sanctions took its 
toll on the Serbian economy and Miloševi moved towards full confrontation with the 
Bosnian Serbs leaders in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  
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Thesis outline 
This thesis charts the use of genocide in Miloševi’s propaganda from the outbreak of 
war in Croatia, until the end of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The first chapter 
provides an historical background for the legacy of genocide in Serbian history. It is 
followed by an analysis of the events that led to the war in Croatia, in Chapter two. It 
argues that Miloševi took active steps to create a war situation on the ground. Chapter 
three looks at how the legacy of genocide played a prominent part when the Croatian war 
was sold to the Serbian public. Chapter four provides a background for the war in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and analyses the use of genocide rhetoric among the Bosnian Serbs. 
Miloševi denied any knowledge of the events in the Bosnian war, and this is dealt with 
in chapter five. Miloševi also argued that the international community was carrying out 
genocide against the Serbs through its trade sanctions. This is explored in chapter six. 
Clarification of concepts 
The main point of analysis in this thesis is the  legacy of genocide and its use as a 
rhetorical device in the speeches and public addresses of Slobodan Miloševi. As 
explained, the concept of genocide was lifted from its historical context and manipulated 
into the regime’s propaganda. This thesis centres on a legacy of genocide, which is 
defined in more detail in chapter one. In those instances where, for reasons of brevity, the 
word genocide appears by itself, the meaning remains the same. Rhetorical device refers 
to the way in which genocide was used in the speeches analysed.  
I have referred to the conflict in the Balkans from 1991 to 1995, as the wars of 
independence in the former Yugoslavia. This is to avoid any discussions of whether the 
conflict was a civil war, or an act of aggression on the part of Serbia. It can also be 
argued, of course, that independence was not the motive of all parties in the conflict. 
However, both the wars in Croatia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina happened as two states 
sought independence, and as self-proclaimed state-lets rebelled within those states. 
Further, I refer to Bosnian forces as the third fighting force in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
alongside Serbian and Croatian forces. This clarification is necessary as both Serbian 
propaganda and Western observers have referred to the Muslim forces of Bosnia-
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Herzegovina. Bosnian forces is more precise, however, as the forces were not uniquely 
Muslim.  
Delimitations 
The focus of this thesis is on the use of genocide in the propaganda of Slobodan 
Miloševi during selected periods during the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. It 
is beyond the scope of this study to provide a full analysis of the concept of genocide in 
Serbia. In particular, I will not attempt to analyse the effects the rhetorical use of 
genocide have on the target audience. Neither will I attempt a comprehensive analysis of 
the receiving end. However, I have found it necessary to briefly look at how Miloševi 
controlled much of the Serbian media, through which his rhetoric was channelled.  
My study of the rhetoric of Slobodan Miloševi is based on interviews and speeches 
published in Serbian media. Each chapter also gives a background to the events on the 
ground, relevant to Miloševi’s rhetoric.  
The analysis of rhetoric is based on excerpts of significant speeches and interviews given 
over a limited time period. The time frame is defined in each chapter. 
I have also included information about Serbia’s actual involvement in the wars in Croatia 
and in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This forms a factual basis against which his rhetoric is 
analysed. Most of the evidence here is from literature on the subject, and from evidence 
gathered and presented at the ICTY in The Hague.  
Previous research 
Nationalism has been widely held as the most important explanatory factor behind the 
descent into war in the former Yugoslavia. In particular, Serb nationalism and the 
relationship between Serbia and the Serbs living in the neighbouring republics have been 
a key point of study. Journalists and scholars have drawn lines from the battle at Kosovo 
Polje in 1389, to the killing fields of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1990s. Returning from 
the battlefield in the 1990s, reporters documented massacres and ethnic cleansing in both 
Croatia and Bosnia. Much of the writing about the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina has 
focused on a united Serbian onslaught on two independent countries.  
  
5 
Such an analysis portrays the Serbs as sharing a set of common interest. Accordingly, war 
was triggered by the insistence that the national interests of the Serbs could only be 
protected if they lived in one state. The establishment of the Republika Srpska (RS) in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska Krajina  (RSK) in Croatia both 
contributed to making war inevitable. Or, in the words of journalists and scholars, 
Yugoslavia, without the strict ethnic balance enforced by the authoritative leader Josip 
Broz, Tito, was simply ripe for war.9 Robert Kaplan coined the term ancient hatred and 
his book Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History published in 1993 gave the 
impression that the region was historically prone to enter into violence because of its 
ethnic mix. 10 Consequently, it would be impossible for the world to act to stop the 
fighting. Although Kaplan’s best-selling book is not academically important, it had 
powerful influence on the former US president Bill Clinton, according to Balkan 
negotiator Richard Holbrooke.11  
Historians have in the recent decade begun scrutinising new evidence and political 
rhetoric, which has made it possible to analyse the conflict from a wider theoretic 
framework. In fact, most scholars specialising in the topic have largely abandoned the 
idea that the bloodshed was an inevitable result of ancient hatred. The wide availability of 
evidence from the ICTY has documented the direct involvement of the Serbian and 
Croatian leaders, thus making it non-plausible that the violence was triggered by simply 
lifting the lid on an ethnic cauldron of hate.  
Historian Branimir Anzulovi has written extensively on the role that ancient myths have 
played in the history of Serbia.12 Similarly, Ivan olovi’s works on the politics of 
symbol in Serbia is among the most authoritative in its field.13  
Among the most authority scholars on the wars, Misha Glenny argues that the war was a 
result of a massive effort to manipulate the masses by fanning the fire of nationalism.14  
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In his book The Dark side of Democracy: Exploring Ethnic Cleansing, Michael Mann 
explores what happens when people see themselves as part of an ethnos, rather than 
demos. In other words, what happens when people start identifying themselves according 
to their ethnicity rather than to the masses of the people within the state. He further 
argues that this is most likely to happen in situations where authoritarian regimes 
“weaken the multi-ethnic environment”.15 As such, the conflicts resulting in ethnic 
cleansing neither stems from ancient hatred nor uniquely from élite manipulation.   
To this date, there are few authoritative sources on the rhetoric of war employed by 
Slobodan Miloševi. In Belgrade, however, several organisations like Argument, the War 
Documentation Centre and the Helsinki Watch have published reports about the war 
propaganda of Slobodan Miloševi. These have been consulted for this thesis.  
David Bruce MacDonald has raised the question of whether there exists a particular 
Balkan holocaust in Croatia and Serbia, which emerged through the victim-centred 
propaganda during the nationalist re-orientation in the two countries. He has argued that 
the genocide is so important for the Serb national ideology, that it can be compared to the 
memory of holocaust in Israel.16 As such, the Serbian holocaust myth has dominated both 
Serbian history writing and has been widely used in propaganda. MacDonald also 
explores the memory of the Jasenovac camp, which I return to in the first chapter in this 
thesis. I will not go into a debate on whether the genocide legacy in Serbia constitutes a 
Holocaust. MacDonald has approached the conflict from a perspective of victimisation. 
As such, his work explores some of the same elements as this thesis. However, the 
sources surveyed are different, and MacDonald is also far wider in his scope .  
As mentioned earlier, this thesis dismisses the idea that the stirring of ethnic hatred 
between ethnic groups was the main purpose of Miloševi’s genocide focus in his 
speeches. Consequently, my theoretical approach is positioned closer to the thoughts of 
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Michael Mann and V.P. Gagnon Jr., particularly in their rejection of focus on ancient 
hatred.17 
Sources 
Slobodan Milosevic’s speech material is available online from the Documentacioni 
centar Ratovi 1991-1999 (War Documentation Centre, DCR) at the Narodna biblioteka 
Srbije (National Library of Serbia Belgrade, NBS). It has collated articles from the 
newspapers Borba and Politika, which contained the full text of the most important 
public addresses and speeches by Miloševi over the period surveyed. Some of this 
articles contains word-for-word transcripts of interview given to the state controlled 
Radio Televizija Srbije (RTS). The vast majority of the speeches analysed are written in 
Serbian, and I have translated them into English.18 Some of the speeches have been 
recorded word-for-word, which has made them difficult to translate into workable 
English. For readers with a command of the Serbian language, the quoted excerpts in the 
original language are included in the footnotes.  
The internet is a volatile medium, however, and since the beginning of my research the 
internet site www.dcwmemory.org.yu has shut down for maintenance. Fortunately, the 
files containing the speeches had by then been downloaded. I have added the full URL at 
the time of access, although it is no longer available. More information on the collection 
of speeches will be available from the web site of the National Library of Serbia website, 
www.nbs.bg.ac.yu.  
In addition, I have examined interviews given in contemporary newspaper articles and by 
people on both sides of the border to Serbia proper. Serbian and international news media 
have been accessed at the vast archive at the British Library in London.  
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Regarding the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 
transcripts from witness hearings and cross-examinations are available on the internet. 
Within the methodological limitations of statements recorded years after the events took 
place, this material constitute a treasure trove for historians. In this study, the material 
made available in the trial against Slobodan Miloševi is of central importance. Although 
the death of the accused put the proceedings to an abrupt end in 2006, the indictments 
and testimonies are of immense value. In this thesis, the documentation forms a base line, 
against which the rhetorical shifts in Slobodan Miloševi’s public addresses are analysed.  
Other sources that have been consulted are autobiographies of the different actors who 
were in contact with Miloševi during the period surveyed. They include Richard 
Holbrooke, David Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg. Other literature that I would mention 
is Yugoslavia – Death of a Nation by the journalists Laura Silber and Allan Little. It is 
widely cited and considered among the best surveys of the wars of independence in 
Yugoslavia. Mark Thompson’s book Forging War – The media in Serbia, Croatia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina has been used for a background on the media situation in the 
former Yugoslavia. My use of oral sources is limited to a two hour long interview with 
Thorvald Stoltenberg in Oslo, conducted on 12 January 2007.  
Theory and methodology 
In order to provide a thorough analysis of Miloševi speeches, it is necessary to briefly 
look into the way in which they were presented to the public. As mentioned, the speeches 
and public addresses have all been taken from cuttings from the two largest newspapers 
in Serbia. I will come back to the media situation in Serbia in chapter one. The analytical 
platform of this study is based on the fact that Miloševi used the media to present his 
rhetoric to the public. This is necessary to mention because I have also emphasised 
rhetorical mechanisms from letters written to various actors during the period surveyed. It 
could be argued that this is personal correspondence, and not a part of Miloševi 
propaganda apparatus. But as I will point out below, the fact that these letters were 
published in important national media, suggest not only approval by the regime, but also 
that the regime had an intention of letting this be known. As such, given the 
government’s control of the editorial policies of the newspaper Politika, I have 
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considered these letters part of the propaganda machinery in Belgrade.  
 
My analysis of rhetoric is approached in the same way as V.P. Gagnon Jr., who confronts 
the criticism that a study of speeches given by authoritarian leaders is meaningless in the 
following way: “The rhetoric of politicians is meaningful. It varies over time, and these 
variations correlate to different outcomes”.19 As such, rhetorical shifts are given a 
meaning in its own right, and in this study they highlight the message that Miloševi 
aimed to present to his audience. Regarding opinion polls, it could be said that polls taken 
in an authoritarian regime are of limited value. However, regarding the situation in 
Yugoslavia, I have chosen to rely on Gagnon Jr.’s evaluation that the scientific polling 
data are as relevant and valid as any social science data in the West.20 I have chosen to 
use polling data presented in independent media in Serbia, notably the news magazine 
Vreme, or those published in international literature on Yugoslavia. 
 
One of the key elements in this thesis is the nature of the relationship between the Serbs 
outside of Serbia, and those who lived in Serbia proper. It was the Serbs in Croatia who 
according to Miloševi was in danger of genocide, and in his speeches Miloševi linked 
their fate to the fate of the people in Serbia proper. Similarly, this thesis will show that 
the threat of genocide was also directed against the whole of the Serbian nation. But what 
was the nature of this sense of collective identity between the Serbs in Serbia and those 
outside the country? I will argue that this relationship was fluid, and shifted according to 
Miloševi interests. Thus, it is not sufficient to use a traditional framework of nationalism 
to explain the evolution of this shared identity in Miloševi’s propaganda.  
 
In a nationalist framework the warring parties were identified according to their ethnic or 
religious belonging. As Benedict Andersen has argued, nations have a “need for a 
narrative of ‘identity’”, much like individuals.21 Nationalistic theory is traditionally, and 
roughly, divided in two camps: According to the primordial approach, a sense of a shared 
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 Anderson, Benedict 1994. Imagined Communities. London-New York: Verso, p. 205. 
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identity has always been present based on religion or language.22 The other camp, 
represented by Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson and others, has argued that nationalism 
is a modern day phenomenon and based on institutions such as compulsory education and 
codification of a written language. Bogdan Denitch is among those who have applied 
nationalism theory to the former Yugoslavia, arguing that a particular ethnic nationalism 
drove the country to war. He argues that the nationalism which emerged in both Serbia 
and Croatia were anchored in myth, tradition, and religious exclusivity, and thus mytho-
poetic and antirational.23 After all, religion and myth were among the few things that the 
Catholic Croats and Orthodox Serbs did not share. The government institutions had 
indeed been multi-national, and under Tito also prohibited expressions of nationalism. 
The nationalist re-orientation was therefore very different from the nationalism that 
emerged in Europe in the late 19th century, based upon the consolidation of a nation state. 
It has also been argued that Serbia’s Ottoman past was an obstacle to the development of 
a modern state based on enlightenment ideas in Napoleonic Europe.24 
 
As the first chapter will show, a nationalist re-orientation did indeed take place both in 
Croatia and in Serbia at the time of war. In both Slovenia and Croatia it was a nationalist 
awakening that brought the country towards independence. In Serbia, nationalist 
sentiments laid the ground for the visions of uniting all Serbs in one state. It was indeed 
this ideology that Miloševi had exploited in his rise to power in the 1980s.  
 
The case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, however, was different. As I will return to, the multi-
cultural tradition in Bosnia-Herzegovina did not easily square with the concept of a 
primordial nationalism based on religious belonging. Among Croatian and Serbian 
nationalists it was common to label the Bosnian Muslims “converts” who had left 
Christianity under Ottoman rule. A consequence of this was also that it became 
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impossible to envisage a multi-cultural nationalism in the former Yugoslavia, when the 
new nationalism was so rooted in the emphasis on religion. The theory of nationalism 
comes short of providing an explanation to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, as it 
overlooks several dynamics inherent within the groups that went to war. 
 
This thesis will identify nationalist currents among both Serbs and Croats, but largely 
dismiss nationalism as a concept of shared identity in the period surveyed. Rather, I have 
found it far more useful to approach the conflict from an élite perspective. The argument 
of purposeful action by political elites has been used by Gagnon, among others. He has 
argued that the political leadership chose war in order to deflect calls for democratic 
change at home. As such, the idea that the mobilisation was a response to prevailing 
nationalism in the population is considered false. On the contrary, Gagnon argues that the 
wars were a result of an attempt to demobilise the population at home, by creating a de 
facto war situation.25 
 
Anthropologist Martijn van Beck at the University of Århus in Denmark has criticized 
what he calls an identity fetishism, in which the identification of a group, culture or 
community offers the greatest guarantees for peace and prosperity for all.26 This 
constitutes “misrecognition”, he argues, of identification and also reproduces the logic of 
discrimination that it seeks to resolve.27 He thus calls for a more fluid articulation of 
identity. 
 
Both van Beck and Gagnon offer an alternative approach to conflict analysis in their 
approach. My study also rejects nationalism as a framework for understanding 
Miloševi’s rhetoric, although it does not deal directly with the causes of the conflict. It is 
clear, however, that a shared sense identity falls short of providing a framework for 
analysis of the relationship between the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and 
those in Serbia proper. As such, the works of Van Beck and Gagnon provides guiding 
                                                           
25
 Gagnon Jr. 2004: pp 1 – 30. 
26
 Van Beck, Martijn ‘Beyond Identity Fetishism: ‘Communal’ Conflict in Ladakh and the Limits of 
Autonomy’, Cultural Anthropology, Volume 14, issue 4, 2000, p 526- 569. 
27
 Van Beck 2000: p 529. 
  
12 
lines, which have been consulted but not closely followed in this thesis.   
 
Group identity among Serbs is a fundamental part of Miloševi rhetoric. In this thesis the 
feeling of shared identity is approached from the common memory trauma rooted in a 
genocidal experience of a victimised group. Of course, it is a fact that Miloševi 
addressed the Serbs outside of Serbia as fellow nationals, but that is only a small part of 
the picture. Nationalism theory does not square with Miloševi focus on multi-
nationality. During the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina he continued to express support for 
yugoslavism, thereby arguing that in fact all the warring parties had an interest in 
following Miloševi line to peace. This contrasts sharply with an analysis based on the 
exclusivity of one particular group, which forms a basis for the theory of nationalism.  
 
This thesis will argue that what Miloševi wished to sell to the Serbian people in his 
speeches was not nationalism. He had used nationalism as a tool to achieve power, but 
the real message was shared victimhood. In the speeches analysed, this was directed at 
different actors as Miloševi saw it fit. The re-emergence of an independent Croatia was 
presented as a threat of genocide against the Serbs based upon a perceived and 
manipulated fear of historical genocide against the Serbs. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the 
image of genocide is more abstract, and directed against foreign forces that had imposed 
genocidal sanctions against Serbia.  
 
The speech analysis does not go into any details when it comes to language structure. The 
methodology of this thesis rests upon the premise that the message of his speeches can be 
analysed without going into details about the semantics of the text. 
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1:  Genocide à la Serbia – historical background 
 
Dr. Karadži, if you keep talking about the genocide of the Serbs so much, you will commit 
a pre-emptive genocide.28 
 
Any modern nation that goes to war will lay claim to a moral superiority over its chosen 
enemy. The Second World War was fought against the evil of Nazism that was fast 
spreading across the globe. The first Gulf War in 1991 was necessary because of the 
dictator Saddam Hussein’s evil onslaught over an independent country, Kuwait. As such, 
a war only becomes just in the eyes of the population if the enemy can successfully be 
portrayed as having evil intentions. The leaders will warn against the alternative of 
restraint, and war is thus presented as the only option. War further demands huge human 
resources, which in a non-totalitarian state is only available if a section of the population 
is willing to take up arms and die for the cause argued by the nation’s leaders. 
Accordingly, it becomes of paramount importance for a nation at war to convince its 
soldiers that they can contribute to a larger collective good. If war is not chosen, the 
dangers confronting the population will outweigh the risk of going to war. Each soldier 
facing the prospect of death in the trenches, should feel convinced that his sacrifice 
contributes to securing the lives of his family and the future of his nation. The political 
leaders who prepare for war must lay out the stakes involved with non-action, preferably 
before the first shot is fired. The wars of independence in the former Yugoslavia were no 
exception.  
 
This chapter will give a background to the genocide legacy, which was used in the 
propaganda of Slobodan Miloševi. While Bosnia and Herzegovina will forever be 
remembered for the first scene of genocide in Europe since the Second World War, the 
word genocide had a familiar rung to the Serbian people long before fighting broke out in 
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Croatia in 1991. In many ways the threat of genocide against Serbs formed the backbone 
of the Belgrade regime’s propaganda.  
 
It has been argued that communist Yugoslavia had simply not allowed an alternative to 
the enforced ideology of brotherhood and unity, and with the death of Tito, the glue that 
kept the nation together dissolved and the federation erupted into bloodshed. I will not 
attempt to judge the validity of this commonly used argument. Rather the aim is to isolate 
the concept of genocide both as an element in the national mobilisation and as a 
rhetorical tool as the war progressed. In order to do so, it is necessary to look back to the 
much-analysed origins of the myth of the Serbia nation, and Miloševi’s rise to power.  
 
The myth of Kosovo 
 
It was on Kosovo that I was born. I was on Kosovo before my birth.29 
 
The legacy of genocide in Serbian history dates back to pre-modern times, and in 
particular the myths of Kosovo. The province to the south of today’s Serbia is home to 
legends of Serbian battles, migrations and religious wars against the Ottoman Empire. In 
Serbian national consciousness, Kosovo is considered Holy Ground.30  As examined, it 
became an aim of the Serbian government to evoke the pseudo-religious myth of the 
Serbian nation. Central to this myth is the memory of the battle on Kosovo Polje in 1389. 
Historians disagree on who actually won the battle, but the version that figures in the 
Serbian national myth remains unambiguous. Prince Lazar, an elected prince of Serbia, 
was according to legend given an ultimatum: He could pay homage to the Turkish Sultan 
Murad I, and give up control of Serbian lands and taxation, or fight the Turks. In a dream 
he was approached by a grey falcon that flew in from Jerusalem, and given a new choice. 
One was an earthly kingdom, meaning victory against the Turks, the other was a 
heavenly kingdom in which Serbs would be defeated and “lay down their lives 
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courageously in Christ, and obtain the crown of suffering (martyrdom), so that they might 
all become partakers of the glory on high”.31 Branimir Anzulovi describes the legacy of 
this battle as a “choice of moral purity over military victory” – after which the Serbs 
could lay claims to a historical “heavenly kingdom”.32 According to the legend, Prince 
Lazar was imprisoned and decapitated.  
 
This battle was elevated to far more than a military defeat for the Serbs. Prince Lazar and 
his men were considered defenders of no less than Christian civilization against the 
expanding Ottoman Empire.33 To this day, it is considered a symbol of steadfast courage 
and sacrifice for honour.34 Every year, Serbs celebrate Vidovdan on the 28 June, as a 
commemoration of the battle. Todorovich and Dragnich describe vividly the impact of 
the battle for the Serbs. “As Vidovdan 1389 came to a close, and the sun went down 
behind the mountains of Zeta (Montenegro) in the west, the night that would last five 
centuries began.”35 
  
Under Ottoman rule, the Serbian state disappeared, but the national identity was carried 
on by the autocephalous Serbian Orthodox Church that was re-established as a 
patriarchate with the seat in the Kosovo town of Pe in 1557.36 Under these arrangements 
the Serbian church enjoyed a considerable degree of religious and cultural autonomy and 
also collected taxes. The patriarchate in Pe came to an end after one of the legendary 
migrations, which later have gained a prominent place in Serbian history. In what has 
become known as Velika Seoba (Great migration) of 1690, Patriarch Arsenius III led tens 
of thousands of Serbs from Kosovo. 37  Their march northwards to today’s Vojvodina, by 
then a part of the Austrian Empire, happened as a result of an Austrian defeat against the 
Ottomans. The scene has been immortalised in a painting by Paja Jovanovi from 1896.38 
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As such, the Serbian church embodied and expressed the ethos of the Serbian people to 
such a degree that religion and ethnicity fused into a distinctive Serbian faith.39 It was 
this national religion, which was mobilised in times of crisis. The battle of Kosovo was 
only one out of many defeats against the Ottomans, and only rose to become a national 
myth with the rise of Serbian nationalism in the 19th century. In fact, it was not until 1892 
that the Orthodox Church elevated the date to a national commemoration.40 As we shall 
see later, the word genocide against Serbs emerged in the 1980s, and thus gained its place 
in the Serbian national consciousness.  
Croatia in the Second World War 
The myth of Kosovo was only one of the legacies exploited in the efforts to unite the 
Serbs behind one national goal. The more tangible rallying point was the sufferings of the 
Serbs during the Second World War. The collective memory of the crimes, and alleged 
genocide, against the Serb civilian population during the war emerged into the public 
sphere as the cultural re-orientation took place in Belgrade. It became an area of interest 
for writers, historians and demographers. As the following chapter will show, it also 
spilled onto the political sphere as soon as the Belgrade regime realised its propaganda 
value. 
  
The history of the Second World War in Yugoslavia remains highly politicised. Tito’s 
partisans had a near monopoly on history writing after he took power, and the suffering 
inflicted upon one national group by another was a taboo subject. In the 1990s, especially 
Serbia and Croatia created their own national histories, often with conflicting accounts of 
the war. It is an indisputable fact, however, that the war was extremely traumatic for the 
Yugoslav federation.  
 
In April 1941, Yugoslavia was overrun by Adolf Hitler’s troops, and bombing levelled 
Belgrade. The fascist Independent State of Croatia (NDH) was set up and covered areas 
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that make up today’s Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Its administration was split 
between Germany and Italy. The NDH developed into a terror state, which carried out 
massacres by the notorious fascist Ustaša forces. From May 1941, mass arrests began of 
Jews but soon also of Serbs. For many of the 1.9 million Serbs living within the borders 
of NDH, the mix between the Hitler’s genocidal anti-Semitism and the Ustaša’s deeply 
rooted hatred of Serbs became deadly. Noel Malcolm argues in his history of Bosnia-
Herzegovina that priority number one was to solve the problem of the large Serb minority 
of 1.9 million out of a population of 6.3 million. Even the Germans are said to have been 
shocked by the brutality of the Ustaša terror.41 The Serbs would have to convert to 
Catholicism, be expelled or killed.42 According to Croatian historian Ivo Bernstein, the 
Ustaša regime had different approaches to dealing with the Serbs in Croatia.  
  
The unwritten Ustaša plan, often mentioned and implemented in practice, was to kill one-
third of the Serbs, banish another third to Serbia, and force the remainder to convert to 
Catholicism. The more moderate Ustaša leaders were for mass deportations into Serbia 
and conversion. The 'hard core', headed by Paveli and his émigré followers, advocated 
the 'use of all means, even the most terrible' (from a 1932 editorial by Paveh in the paper 
Ustaga), i.e. death.43 
 
To expedite their goal, the Ustaša set up a network of concentration camps, of which the 
Jasenovac camp became the most notorious.  
 
The number of people killed in the NDH has been widely debated. A precise figure is not 
known, partly for political reasons. The war was put to an end with the victory of Tito’s 
partisans, whose multinational platform had helped  a broad recruitment against the Nazi 
enemy. After the war, expressions of national sentiments became officially outlawed. 
This included using the sufferings of a particular national group to promote nationalist 
sentiments. Tito also realised the potential devastating effect demographic studies from 
the Second World War could have on his imposed multi-national harmony, if academics 
were to compare and contrast the numbers of deaths inflicted on one nation upon another. 
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Therefore, any thorough analysis was treated in Belgrade as a state secret.44 One survey, 
conducted in 1964 concluded that almost 600,000 people had been killed in all of 
Yugoslavia, but figure is uncertain.45 This was much lower than the official 1.7 million 
based on which Yugoslavia had claimed war damages, and the survey became an official 
embarrassment and hence kept secret.46   
 
As the national mobilisation drive in Belgrade gathered pace, so did the attempts to 
politicise the casualty figures. The Jasenovac camp became in Serbia the symbol of the 
Croatian Ustaša’s attempts to eradicate the Serb population of Croatia. As the Ustaša was 
driven from power in 1945, the camp buildings were blown up, and the archives burnt. 
This has made it more difficult to establish a precise death toll, but arguably the lack of 
firm scientific evidence has only fuelled speculation.  
 
In Belgrade, it is generally claimed that as many as 700,000 people lost their lives in the 
Jasenovac camp, despite the fact that the 1964 survey concluded that the figure was 
almost as many as the total number of Yugoslavs killed in the war.47 At the time war 
broke out in Croatia, Miloševi argued that more than 700,000 “Serbs, Jews and Gypsies” 
lost their lives in Jasenovac alone.48  
 
The two most reliable sources for Serbian losses during the Second World War are the 
demographers Bogoljub Koovi and Vladimir Žerjavi. Koovi, himself a Serb, 
estimated that a total of 125,000 Serbs lost their lives in Croatia during the Second World 
War.49 Žerjavi, who was a Croat and worked in Zagreb, estimated that in total 137,000 
Serbs lost their lives in Croatia.50 They both concluded that the total losses in the war was 
around one million, thus significantly lower that the official death toll. Their work is still 
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considered controversial, and Žerjavi has been labelled a holocaust denier because of his 
studies.  
Cultural re-orientation in Serbia 
After the Second World War, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) was 
set up.51 Its 1946 constitution stipulated that Yugoslavia consisted of six socialist 
republics, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Macedonia. In 
addition Kosovo and Vojvodina had a status of autonomous districts within Serbia.  
The leader of the communist resistance Partisans, Josip Broz Tito, was considered the 
“father” of the nation and supreme ruler. He outlawed any expressions of nationalism in 
the multi-national Yugoslavia. Tito had preserved the unity of the country through a 
forced multi-national and socialist ideology, but also through acts of repression and 
persecution of political objectors. Those that thread too far in the direction of democratic 
reforms, soon realised the slogan of brotherhood and unity could mean imprisonment and 
years in prison on the notorious Goli Otok, Yugoslavia’s own gulag. 
 
But the forces of repression could not stop the seed of reform. Persecution was indeed the 
only tool at the regimes disposal. The Croatian spring in 1971 lit the hope of democratic 
reforms, but was ruthlessly crushed by the regime. In Belgrade, dissent grew among the 
cultural intelligentsia. Tito’s death in 1980 left Yugoslavia in a power vacuum, and was 
followed by years of economic stagnation and political gridlock. A rotating presidency 
meant to guarantee against the rise of a dictator, also left the country without an effective 
leadership.  
 
At the time, it became evident that any attempts that there had been of common cultural 
Yugoslav identity was under threat. Andrew Baruch Wachtel argues that the political and 
cultural elites in Yugoslavia abandoned efforts of cultural nation building and thus 
created the conditions for the collapse of the Yugoslav state.52 Belgrade was in the 1980s 
centre for a cultural and intellectual re-orientation.  
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Myth making and the cultivation of symbols now re-surfaced among cultural elites in 
Belgrade Once again, Kosovo occupied centred ground. The defeat in the battle of 
Kosovo in 1389 was feted as one of the world’s most important military battles. It is still 
a symbol of the strength of the Serbian nation, and Kosovo hosts several of the most holy 
shrines in the Serbian Orthodox Church. But Kosovo also had contemporary urgency in 
the 1980s. Kosovo’s autonomy, granted by Tito in the constitution of 1974, was 
considered shameful, and dangerous for the Serb minority in Kosovo. In spring 1981, 
riots broke out in Kosovo, and unrest spread throughout the province.53 A demand rose 
for the repeal of Kosovo’s autonomous status. As early as 1984, Todorovich and 
Dragnich reflected on what was to come in Kosovo. 
 
The reluctance of the central government, as well as that of Serbia, to intervene directly 
in Kosovo affairs, does not satisfy Yugoslavs who are eager and impatient to see a 
resolution of the problem.54  
 
In 1986, the highly regarded Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences (SANU) published 
the Memorandum that opened the lid to sentiments that earlier had been forbidden in 
Serbia. It was a powerful document calling for a re-awakening of no less than the 
spiritual being of Serbia, as this excerpt shows: 
 
In less than fifty years, over two successive generations, the Serbian nation has been 
exposed to such severe trials - twice exposed to physical extermination, to forced 
assimilation, to religious conversion, to cultural genocide, to ideological indoctrination, 
and to the denigration and renunciation of their own traditions beneath an imposed guilt 
complex, and thereby disarmed intellectually and politically, that they could not but leave 
deep spiritual wounds that cannot be ignored as this century of the great technological 
takeoff draws to a close. In order to have a future in the international family of cultured 
and civilized nations, the Serbian nation must have an opportunity to find itself again and 
become a historical agent, must re-acquire an awareness of its historical and spiritual 
being, must look its economic and cultural interests square in the eyes, and must find a 
modern social and national program that will inspire this generation and generations to 
come. 55  
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As Baruch Wachtel argues, the failure to nurture a strong unitarist Yugoslav culture set 
the scene for the gradual demise of the federation’s federal institutions.56 This surfaced in 
the frequent debates about the school curricula in the different republics, in which 
language and literature evoked strong nationalist sentiments.57   
 
Ivan olovi argues that the myth of the Serbian national identity had a special focus on 
uniqueness, which separated the Serbs from the rest of the world.  
 
Its special character is not relative, but absolute. It is more special than any other, because 
that original existence, which cannot be compared to anything known, is in fact today the 
only existence of one nation in the world. Serbia is the only country which is consistently 
true to its self, capable of shaping that self as original and unique.58  
 
As such, a particular Serbian national myth filled a void that the lack of a common 
Yugoslav culture had created. It was in this political environment that Slobodan 
Miloševi stepped onto the political arena in Belgrade.  
Miloševi’s “revolution” 
The Serbian communist banker had cunningly manipulated the feeling of insecurity 
among Serbs in Kosovo, and made his way to the very top of the Serb communist party. 
Perhaps the most cited episode in the political re-orientation towards nationalism took 
place during Miloševi’s visit to Kosovo Polje in April 1987. Outside the House of 
Culture a crowd of Serbian demonstrators had gathered, and soon scuffles broke out with 
the local police. Miloševi then addressed the crowd with the words “no one should dare 
to beat you”. It was the most important speech of his career, and is regarded as a rallying 
cry for Serbian nationalism.59  
 
Miloševi then rose to power within the communist establishment on the back of what he 
called an anti-bureaucratic revolution. In fact, his so-called revolution was less a popular 
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uprising and more an attempt to manifest his own hold of power. The strategy was 
simple: By paying unemployed youths from Serbia to travel to the provinces and 
participate in violent anti-bureaucratic demonstrations, Miloševi argued that there was 
massive popular call to end the regional autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina.60  Rather 
than reflecting popular sentiments, it can be argued that the anti-bureaucratic revolution 
was a response to a cultural re-orientation in Serbia, in which the autonomy of Kosovo 
became an acute issue that had to be dealt with. It also provided Miloševi with a 
platform to attack reformists within the Serbian party, who were the main challengers to 
his rise to power.61 The much-cited biographer, Slavoljub Djuki, argues that Miloševi 
saw himself as Tito’s heir, and aspired to rule over a centralised Yugoslav state.62 Multi-
party democracy was, by its very definition, bound to pose a real threat to such an 
ambition. The violent nationalism expressed in the anti-bureaucratic revolution, had been 
effective in forcing out reformists from the party leadership. This initial resurgence of 
nationalist political struggle that had helped Miloševi to power had taken place within 
the communist parties.63  
 
As opposed to the new generation of Eastern European leaders who had overthrown 
Communism in the 1990s, Miloševi had no wide popular mandate for his hold on power. 
However, he realised the politically potency of the sense of victimisation held by the 
Serbs, something he had exploited in Kosovo. A similar perception of a threat was 
created in Croatia, and also in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  
What happens now? 
It can be argued that the Miloševi attempts to spread fear was aided by a former officer 
in the Yugoslav army, named Franjo Tuman. He had himself fought against the Ustaša 
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forces in NDH, but gradually realised the political potentials of nationalism. During 
Tuman’s stay in Belgrade, he became frustrated by efforts to belittle the Croatian 
participation in the partisan struggle against the Germans.64 In 1961, he was appointed 
leader of the newly established Institute for the History of the Working-Class Movement 
in Zagreb, a position he exploited for his own political gain. Tuman’s nationalism put 
him in jail, as Tito purged Croatian leaders following the crackdown on the Croatian 
spring in 1971.65  
  
Realising the momentous events in Belgrade, where Slobodan Miloševi had promoted 
himself on an aggressive policy line, Tuman returned to politics in Zagreb on a 
nationalist platform. He had travelled widely abroad in the 80s, and fostered ties with 
Croatia’s exiled ex-patriots, several of them former Ustaša supporters who had fled 
Socialist Yugoslavia as Tito took over.66  The political line was nationalist, and the 
creation of an independent state of Croatia became Tuman’s main goal. At the Lipinski 
Concert hall in Zagreb, 2500 delegates cheered as Tuman laid out his visions for the 
party, and its revisionist take on history.  
 
Our opponents see nothing in our program but the claim for the restoration of the 
independent Croatian ustaša state. These people fail to see that the state was not the 
creation of fascist criminals; it also stood for the historic aspirations of the Croatian 
people as an independent state. They knew that Hitler planned to build a new European 
order.67 
 
The proclamation of this ideology, secured Tuman’s notoriety among international 
leaders and moderate Croats, despite the fact that the leaders of the HDZ said they only 
praised the good parts of the Ustaša state. It openly called for the dismantling of the 
federal state of Yugoslavia, which would have guaranteed the leaders a jail sentence 
under Tito. 
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As the HDZ secured a major victory in the April 1990 election, Tuman became the 
country’s undisputed leader. In position, he was free to pursue a policy which publicly 
involved securing Croatia’s border. Secretly, however, he laid plans to annex part of 
Bosnia, in agreement with the Serbian leader, Slobodan Miloševi.68  
 
The developments in Croatia gave the Serb minority population reasons to worry. This 
nationalist re-orientation made it necessary, according to the HDZ, to redress the 
perceived historical imbalances in Croatia. This involved stripping the Serbs in Croatia of 
positions in the police, media and local government. In the words of an extremist HDZ 
leader Šime Djodan: “There won’t be any improvement for Croatia until a Croatian rifle 
is on a Croatian shoulder and a Croatian wallet in a Croatian pocket.”69 In December 
1990, Croatia changed its constitution, relegating the Serbs from “constituent nation” to 
“national minority”.70 Soon, the checkerboard Šahovnica flags were flying from Croatian 
flag posts across the country. 71  It had been the symbol of the fascist regime of the 
Ustaša, and unsurprisingly the Serb population reacted negatively as it became a symbol 
of an independent Croatia.  
 
It can be argued that the nationalist re-orientation in Croatia and Serbia fed off each 
other. At the same time as Tuman focused his efforts on restoring an independent 
Croatian state, Serbian writers published works that dealt directly with the situation for 
the Serbs in the Second World War. One of the leading academics who wrote about the 
genocide against the Serbs in the war, later became a key advisor to president Slobodan 
Miloševi. Professor Smilja Avramov published the book Genocide in Yugoslavia in the 
Light of International Law in 1992. She argued that the Serbs had been subjected to 
genocide in the Second World War, and that Tito had failed to protect the Serbs from a 
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renewed genocide in Kosovo. During the trial against Miloševi, she appeared as defence 
witness.72 It was one of many books that were published on the subject in 1992.73  
 
For the local Serb population, the HDZ take-over in Croatia created mass consternation. 
There was only one generation between them and the atrocities carried out against the 
Serbs in fascist NDH. With a revisionist party in power, and a massive campaign in 
Belgrade, local Serbs were confronted with one uncomfortable question: What happens 
now? 
Summary 
Years before the first shots were fired in the war in Croatia, nationalist politicians had 
lifted historical legacies onto a political level as they saw it fit. In Serbia, the myth of 
Kosovo was evoked in the 1980s and constituted an important part of the definition of 
genocide around which this thesis is built. As examined, genocide came to mean forced 
expulsion of the Serbian people from Kosovo. This legacy was strengthened by the re-
emergence of hitherto suppressed literature about the alleged genocide against the Serbs 
in the fascist NDH.74 As such, genocide could be perpetrated by forcing the Serbs to 
migrate, or by exterminating the whole or parts of the Serbian nation. This constitutes the 
definition of the genocide legacy used in this thesis. This chapter has analysed how it 
emerged on the political agenda, as a nationalist re-orientation took place in both Serbia 
and Croatia. In many ways, these developments went hand in hand. As we shall return to, 
Miloševi exploited the legacy of genocide in his speeches. Arguably, Tuman 
accommodated this by appearing to evoking symbols from the Second World War, and 
arguing that the number of war deaths was far lower than estimated.  The next chapter 
will look at the developments which forced the newly state of Croatia into war.  
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2: Let the wars begin 
By spring 1991, Yugoslavia as a federation was about to fade into history. The key 
question facing the region was how to merge the new demands of an emerging national 
consciousness, with the region’s multi-national tradition. Croatia and Slovenia were both 
on the path to independence, and for the Serbs in Croatia the relationship with Serbia 
became an acute issue.  
 
This chapter charts the drift into war in Croatia, and the pivotal role played by Miloševi 
in this process. It argues that Miloševi, through a government controlled press, stoked a 
fear of genocide in the Serbian population, and that this imagery of fear served several 
purposes. The genocide legacy was used to silence the opposition at home at a time when 
his regime was deeply unpopular. Also, an image of imminent threat portrayed the war in 
Croatia as inevitable, despite Miloševi’s involvement in creating a war situation. In 
order to understand how the genocide legacy was disseminated to the Serbian public, it is 
necessary to briefly look at Miloševi’s control of the media.  
In control of the press 
The media in Serbia was government controlled, and the restrictions on the editorial 
freedom increased during the course of the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. As a 
result, the facts from the war as presented to the Serbian people were distorted. The 
author Mark Thompson has documented how acts of aggression carried out by the Serbs 
were played down in the Serbian media. Therefore, Miloševi could also use the media to 
disseminate a view that the Serbs were the victims in the wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Croatia.  
The main news provider in Serbia was Radio-Televizija Srbije (RTS). It was the only 
television network that could be reached throughout the country, and one third of the 
population of Serbia only received the RTS news.75 It had traditionally been close to the 
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government, and under Miloševi it was regarded as a state resource like the police and 
the army. As a subsidiary of RTS, Belgrade Television played prominent role during the 
demonstrations in March 1991. Opposition leader Vuk Draškovi was accused of plotting 
to destabilise Serbia. Miloševi used Belgrade television as his propaganda tool, and 
refused to give air time to the opposition.76  
The variety of print media in Serbia has always been rich, with a total of 300 publications 
at the time war broke out. Print media was dominated by the Politika group. The daily 
newspaper Politika is the most authoritative national newspaper. The publishing group 
was never officially owned by the government, but during the 1980s the government 
influenced its editorial policy.77 From 1987 the government’s control over Politika 
gradually strengthened, and the editor-in-chief Živorad Minovi endorsed Miloševi’s 
rise to power.78 Minovi was later forced out by the journalist union, but Politika 
remained a supporter of the nationalist re-orientation under Miloševi. Former editor 
Aleksandar Nenadovi lamented the paper’s new role.  
The explosion of nationalism was something so authentic, so Serbian. Communism was 
relatively thin, imported, new. And Politika was at the heart of this thing. The regime 
took out everything that was good about us, and made the paper a launching pad for the 
nationalist offensive. They killed its liberal soul.79  
 
The daily newspaper Borba had traditionally been the official mouth piece of the 
communist party, but in the late 1980s and 1990s it distanced itself from the government. 
According to Mark Thompson, Borba made efforts to balance their coverage, at least 
during the war in Croatia.80 In 1994, the government later clamped down on its 
independent role, triggering a protest from its editorial staff. It led to the creation of Naša 
Borba, an independent newspaper set up by many of the former staff of Borba, which 
rejected any political attempts to control its editorial policy.    
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Opposition channels like B92 and Studio B provided independent reporting throughout 
the war , but could only reach the people in the larger cities in Serbia. They were also 
targeted by the government, especially in times of national crisis. The weekly Vreme also 
proved to be a head ache for the government, as it refused to budge when pressured. It 
stayed independent, and provided a trusted news sources throughout the war. 
The government’s attempts to control the media, naturally affected the coverage. 
Journalists covering demonstrations against the regime in June 1993 were arrested.81 
Other unofficial measures to restrict coverage was shutting off electricity supply, and 
limiting news print. 
The government-controlled media in Serbia became a powerful tool, both as a channel for 
Miloševi’s rhetoric and as a provider of a distorted coverage of the war. The rise of 
nationalism in Croatia, analysed in the previous chapter, fed Miloševi’s propaganda 
machinery. The following passage from the Milan Babi’s witness statement to the ICTY 
indicates how the regime actively engaged in disseminating the plight of the Krajina 
Serbs:  
 
Prosecution: Were the Serbs in Croatia in an unfavourable position in Croatia 
at that time? 
Babi: It is a fact that the municipalities with the majority Serb population in Croatia fell 
within the category of underdeveloped, economically underdeveloped regions. On the other 
hand, many Serbs realised that the former communist regime displayed a certain 
discrimination and suppressed the Serbs' linguistic identity in those 14 areas of Croatia. 
Furthermore, at that time there was a media campaign to shed light on the position of the Serb 
people in Croatia which depicted their status as inferior as and worse than the position of the 
majority Croat population. 
Prosecution: This media campaign, who conducted this campaign? Can you tell 
us? 
Babi: That campaign was conducted by the state-owned media from Serbia, especially from 
Belgrade.82 
 
Through his control of the media, Slobodan Miloševi had a unique tool for 
dissemination what lay at the core of his propaganda machinery, namely the threat of 
genocide facing the Serbs.   
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Belgrade’s friends in Croatia. 
Despite Miloševi’s insistence that the war was forced upon Serbia, much evidence has 
since surfaced about his involvement in arming and supporting the violent Serb uprising.  
In 1990, the Krajina Serbs gradually become more and more isolated from the Tuman 
regime in Zagreb. The Serbian Democratic Party in Krajina (RSK) was initially set up to 
protect the interest of the Serb minority. The electoral success of that party, however, 
cannot exclusively be interpreted as a support for hard-line nationalist line. In fact, only 
27 percent said that they voted for the Serb nationalist party because the communist party 
“does not sufficiently represent the interest of my nation”.83 Zagreb University showed 
that 80 per cent of Serbs and Croats did not agree that members of the other group were 
privileged.84 
 
During the summer of 1990, a Croatian constitution was pushed through without 
mentioning the Serbs. This was part of Tuman’s grand design for a Croatian national 
state. The reactions from the Serbs were radicalization, and moderates like Jovan 
Raškovi were sidelined.85 The police force in Serb regions of the Krajina established 
their own de facto police jurisdiction after they refused to wear the Croatian police 
uniform, which carried the checkerboard Šahovnica also used by the fascist Ustaša. When 
the Croats failed to stamp out the rebellion with force, the Serb regions in Krajina became 
a nascent state-let, with the support of Belgrade. Following a referendum in 1990, in 
which 99.7 percent supported sovereignty and autonomy in Croatia, the Serbian 
autonomous district (SAO) was created. The slide into full-scale war seemed inevitable, 
as isolated violence triggered violent reactions from both sides. According to Milan 
Babi, the Serb side operated according to planned tactics. Militia groups provoked 
Croatian settlements and villages. When the response came, the Yugoslav National Army 
(JNA) crushed the Croat defences and forced non-Serbs to flee.86  
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The clashes in the Krajina, however, were not a local phenomenon. The militia police 
were controlled by Belgrade, according to Milan Babi, the hard-line SDS leader. Its 
constructors were from Serbia proper, and took its order from the Serb Ministry of the 
Interior.87  
 
In his witness statement in the trial against Miloševi at the ICTY, financial expert 
Morten Torkildsen testified that the Serbian Republic in Krajina, as well as the Republika 
Srpska (RS), was reliant on Serbia for funding through well-organised financial 
arrangements.88 In the Serbian Croat capital of Knin, Miloševi was known as the boss.89 
 
It can consequently be argued that Miloševi was heavily involved in the drive towards 
war in Croatia. But as will be shown below, the people of Serbia were not ready for a 
bloody war in Croatia.  
The threat from the streets 
The regime in Belgrade was heavily involved in preparing the ground for war in Croatia. 
But on the home front, Miloševi was challenged in the streets. The orchestrated slide 
into war did not enjoy popular support. In order to analyse Miloševi propaganda during 
the war, it is necessary to look at the situation in Belgrade in 1991.  
 
As shown in the first chapter, Miloševi rose to power on the back of an anti-bureaucratic 
revolution. But his rule came far short of answering a popular call for democratic reform. 
He belonged to the ancien régime, and realised the threat from democratic reformists.  
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In 1990, Miloševi prepared for the first multi-party elections since 1945. Despite the fact 
that he had risen to power on a nationalist platform, his party refrained from any sign of 
extremism during the elections. The Miloševi-led League of Communists of Serbia 
changed its name to the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS). It opted for not playing the hatred 
card in the election campaign, and focused instead on moderate change and addressing 
economic insecurity.90 Miloševi’s SPS won the elections comfortably.91  A conclusion 
that can be drawn from this is that the hard-line nationalist stance taken by Miloševi 
during the late 1980s was most effective within the old establishment of the League of 
Communists Serbia (later SPS). Faced with the opposition outside the party system, his 
aggressive nationalism was downplayed. We shall return to how this also happened 
during the elections in 1992, when a moderate candidate challenged Miloševi.  
 
The Serb population did not see the multi-party elections in 1990 as a satisfactory answer 
to their call for democracy. This was particularly the case in Belgrade were only 15 per 
cent had supported the ruling SPS party.92  In March 1991, hundreds of thousands of 
protesters poured onto the streets of Belgrade, with massive calls for democratic reforms. 
The protests had begun against the government’s domination of the media in the election. 
As the riot police attempted to break up the protests, one student and one police man was 
killed.93 Later, the army was called in, opposition leader Vuk Draškovi arrested, and 
independent media shut down. But protesters refused to give up, and thousands of 
students took to the streets in the city centre for ten days.  
 
There are many examples of regime retaliation against those who refused to take part in 
Miloševi’s war efforts. These were covered in the independent weekly news magazine, 
Vreme. State-owned industries laid off workers who refused to go to war, and others were 
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conscripted forcefully into the army. This happened to the dissident president of the 
Social Democratic Party of Vojvodina, who was labelled an ally of the fascist bandits in 
Croatia, arrested and forced into the army.94  As such, Miloševi made sure that there was 
no room for dissent.  
Summary 
The war that broke out in Croatia in the summer of 1991, was not a result of spontaneous 
outbursts of violence which the Belgrade regime later got involved in.95 On the contrary, 
evidence suggests that the war was orchestrated by the Miloševi regime. This indicates 
that Miloševi actively created a war situation into which his genocide rhetoric would fit. 
At the same time, the regime took steps to control the Serbian media, and thus secured a 
channel to disseminate their propaganda to a war-sceptical audience in Serbia. The war in 
Croatia was as such forced on the Serbian people, and the fear of genocide became an 
instrument to legitimise the fighting. The next chapter will show how Miloševi for this 
purpose used and exploited a sense of threat in his efforts to sell the war to the public in 
Serbia.  
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3: Selling the war on the home front 
The Serbian involvement in arming Serbs in Croatia is undisputed, most notably 
according to evidence gathered and judgments passed by the ICTY. It is beyond the 
scope of this thesis to discuss the motives for starting a rush toward war, but as we will 
return to, desertion rates and street protests indicate that this was not a popular war in 
Serbia.96 Consequently, it can be argued that the war in Croatia could not be used as a 
propaganda tool in a country which was not ready for war.97 Vuk Karadži, of the Serbian 
Renewal Movement, called for an amnesty for deserters, and accused Slobodan 
Miloševi of war crimes.98 A poll published in the independent newsmagazine Vreme on 
18 November 1991, showed that 78 per cent of Serbs favoured keeping the peace at all 
costs.99  
 
Slobodan Miloševi’s response to the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the pressure from the 
opposition at home was inter-linked. It is well proven, through evidence given and 
judgments passed at the ICTY, that Serbia played a fundamental role in arming Serbs in 
the Krajina. As the war grew in intensity, the Croatian Serbs were able to expand 
territorially in Croatia. The Belgrade regime had thus laid the foundations for an 
expanded Serbian state, in which all Serbs were to be united. This had been an important 
aim formulated in the cultural re-orientation of the country in the late 1980s, and also part 
of the platform that made it possible for Slobodan Miloševi to exploit nationalism in his 
rise to power. 
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Confronting critics at home 
The March demonstrations in 1991 were perhaps the most serious challenge to Slobodan 
Miloševi’s rule before he was ousted from power in 2000. The regime’s reaction was 
two-fold – violence and a ferocious verbal attack on his opponent through government-
controlled press. On 11 March, Slobodan Miloševi addressed the deputies at the Serbian 
national assembly in Belgrade. The following day, the speech was published in full text 
in the major national dailies Borba and Politika: 
 
Respected people’s deputies, 
Serbia and the Serbian people are confronted with one of the greatest evil in their history, 
with the stirring up of discord and conflict. This evil, which has so many times in the past 
brought out people damage, casualties and suffering, weakened our strength and shattered 
our unity, has always and only been to the benefit of those who want to take away our 
freedom and dignity, to subjugate us and submit us to their interests. This profound 
difficult historical memory and the warnings we carry from the past are today more 
important than ever before to the Serbian people and the citizens of Serbia. Because the 
sowing of discord among our people has always been and has remained the easiest way to 
attack the values that have always been sacred to the Serbian people, to attack its freedom 
and independence, the peaceful, decent and dignified life of every one of its members. 
Everyone who cares about Serbia, its citizens, the entire Serbian nation, the values that 
are most important to every man, should not disregard these facts, especially at a time 
when we are tirelessly struggling to stand in the way of revamped fascistic Ustaša forces, 
Albanian secessionists and all other forces of anti-Serb coalition that threaten the freedom 
and the rights of men.100  
 
The speech identifies a set of rhetorical devices that re-emerges in most of his public 
addresses during the war in Croatia.  
 
1. The alternatives to his rule are anarchy and terror, and critics of his regime are 
traitors.  
2. Foreign pressures are destroying Yugoslavia. 
3. The Tuman government is secessionist, and pro-fascist.  
4. The genocide against Serbs could repeat itself if the Serbs are not allowed to defend 
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themselves.  
 
The message in Milosevic's speech to the assembly on 9 March 1991 is clear: The 
protesters threaten the democratic institutions of Serbia. Outside forces have “sowed 
dissent” in Serbia and the very same forces are threatening to bring back the “warnings 
we carry from the past”.101 In fact, these “warnings from the past” was evoked several 
times over the next years, as Miloševi responded to a war he himself played an 
important part in starting.  
Yugoslavia – not Greater Serbia 
At the same time as Miloševi was shoring up extremist Serb leaders in Croatia, 
negotiations were taking place to find a lasting solution for the survival of Yugoslavia. 
This was not a new debate, but had been an issue since Tito died in 1980. The Serbs 
asked for a more centralised federal leadership, while Croatia and Slovenia initially 
called for a status quo. After 1986, however, the two western republics opted for a 
confederal Yugoslavia, which in effect meant independence.102 As shown earlier the 
electorate in Serbia and Croatia had voted for nationalist parties. However, this does not 
show that radical nationalism was the most popular way forward. One indication of the 
limited support for nationalism is the popularity of federal Prime Minister Ante Markovi 
and his government, the Federal Executive Council (SIV). Markovi called for peaceful 
reforms and economic progress in Yugoslavia, and warned against nationalism. In June 
1990, 81 per cent in Serbia (not Kosovo) replied positively to a question if they would 
give Markovi a vote of confidence. 64 per cent saw Markovi’s reforms as the right 
solution to get out of the crisis.103  
 
Finding a lasting solution to the Yugoslav problem was also a challenge for the 
international community.  In 1991, the European Community (EC) saw a settlement to 
this crisis in Yugoslavia as a priority in its nascent common foreign policy.  The line 
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from Brussels was clear: The EC would not support any moves towards dissolution of 
Yugoslavia. It was up to the Yugoslav republics to decide whether that would be a federal 
or confederal solution.  
 
It can be argued that the focus on keeping Yugoslavia together played straight into the 
hands of Slobodan Miloševi in Belgrade. It gave him an opportunity to merge two 
visions of the future of Serbia. He could argue that Serbs could best be protected against 
genocide if they lived in one state, and dismissed out of hand the suggestion that 
Yugoslavia could be a confederation of independent states. At the same time, he could 
present himself as a man of peace by arguing for a federal Yugoslav solution, which at 
the time held a strong position in the Serb population.  By the time the drive towards 
independence had reached Croatia, he could pull the independence card, and argue that it 
also applied for the Serbs in Croatia.  
 
As will be shown later, the aim of the Serbian political factions in both Croatia and later 
Bosnia was to make it possible for all Serbs to live in one state. Miloševi also mentions 
this ideal in his speech to the assembly. However, there are important nuances in how this 
aim could be achieved. While Miloševi evoked the national myth of Serbia by 
mentioning the sacred values of the Serbian people, the ideal solution that can secure 
safety for all Serbs could be found within Yugoslavia – not a vision of Greater Serbia. He 
said:  
 
In this way, Serbia would finally be forced to abandon the political ideal with which it 
entered into the creation of Yugoslavia – the inclusion of the entire Serbian nation in one 
state.  
 
It can be argued that Miloševi’s future visions of Yugoslavia were little different from a 
Greater Serbia under his control. That, however, does not refute the fact that, in the face 
of an opposition, he chose to use words that held a strong resonance with the Serbian 
people. Simply put, the rhetoric of Greater Serbia implies war. Yugoslavia evokes 
stability and harmony for the people. Even though his support for the war in Croatia had 
been going on for months, the rhetoric of war is downplayed.  
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Slobodan Miloševi presented himself as a saviour of Yugoslavia: 
 
Serbia, as is well known, has opted to remain in Yugoslavia and defend it together with 
all those who share our belief. And each of the Yugoslav nations who wish to leave 
Yugoslavia can do so in a legal way, without violence.104 
 
In the same statement, he directly dismissed claims that his aim is a Greater Serbian state. 
 
In recent months we have been hearing a lot of slogans about Serbia up to Rijeka and 
Croatia up to Zemun.105 I am sure that there isn’t a Serbian or a Croatian mother who 
would agree to have her children go to war for a Serbia up to Rijeka or a Croatia up to 
Zemun.106 
 
Ironically, the desertion rates in the war that followed a few months later showed that 
Miloševi had a point. The problem for him was that the Serbian mothers turned against a 
war that he himself had launched, although he insisted that Serbia up to Rijeka was way 
beyond his territorial ambitions.  
 
During a press conference in Paris late August, 1991, Miloševi was confronted directly 
with the alleged aspirations of a Greater Serbia: 
 
I have already said many times that Serbia has no territorial aspirations. But, Serbs who 
live in regions outside of Serbia wish to remain in Yugoslavia, while there are one-sided 
attempts to drive them out of Yugoslavia. No one has a right to deny them the right to 
stay in Yugoslavia.107 
 
He told the Serbian assembly that only a federal Yugoslavia could protect and uphold the 
ethnic mix in his country.  
 
Therefore, all those holding a scissors above the map of Yugoslavia should keep in mind 
that different nations in nationally mixed countries can preserve their identity and 
                                                           
104
 ‘Statement to Belgrade Television after the session of the SFRY presidency’, 9 May 1991, Politika  
http://www.dcwmemory.org.yu/eng/arhiv/sm/1991/101991.pdf, accessed: 8 August 2007. 
105
 Rijeka is a Croatian town north on the Croatian Adriatic coast line. Zemun is a Serbian village just west 
of the capital Belgrade.  
106
 9 May 1991, Politika, (DCR/NBS). 
107
 Authors translation. Serbian text: Ve nekoliko puta sam rekao da Srbija nema nikakve teritorijalne 
pretenzije. Ali, Srbi koji žive u oblastima van Srbije hoe da ostanu u Jugoslaviji, dok se jednostranim 
aktima nastoji da se oni odvoje od Jugoslavije. Niko nema pravo da im onemoguava da ostanu u 
Jugoslaviji,  ’Odgovori novinarima na konferenciji za štampu u parizu,’ 29 August 1991, Borba, 
(DCR/NBS), http://www.dcwmemory.org.yu/ser/arhiv/sm/1991/451991.pdf, accesssed: 19 August 2006.    
  
38 
integrity only if that country ensures national equality. This is why efforts to abolish one 
country in order to create several nationalist state-lets are in contrast with modern 
tendencies in the world and convey non-historical and conservative ideas. Efforts to turn 
the borders of the Yugoslav republics into states borders are an absurd idea, especially in 
Europe where boundaries between thousand-year-old countries are quickly 
disappearing.108 
 
Miloševi’s insistence on Yugoslavia is particularly interesting in light of the fact that he 
and Franjo Tuman had in practice written off Yugoslavia’s future in their meeting at 
Karadjordjevo 15 March 1991.109    
The ghost of genocide 
The following excerpts will show how Miloševi’s referred to the genocide legacy during 
autumn 1991. This happened at the same time as the JNA was heavily involved in the 
fighting in Croatia. As mentioned earlier, recruitment into the army was difficult, and this 
was particularly the case over the exceptionally brutal battle over Vukovar, where the 
JNA struggled to win over a supposedly far weaker enemy. 110 
  
According to Miloševi, conflict had erupted out of Croatia’s nationalism and re-
habilitation of its pro-fascist past. It constituted an acute danger to the Serbs living in 
Croatia, who shared nationhood with Serbia proper. Independence for Croatia could only 
be accepted if the Serbs in Croatia were granted some sort of self-determination. But 
above all, the Serbs wanted peace, Miloševi said. Contrary to what was written in the 
international press, the Serb struggle was against nationalism, and preserving Yugoslavia 
was the only thinkable bulwark for further spread of nationalism. As will be shown 
below, these were the elements in Miloševi’s propaganda drive in 1991.  
 
In May 1991, the clock was ticking fast for a permanent and non-violent settlement to 
Yugoslavia’s problems. In a statement to the Serb parliament on 30 May, Miloševi 
refuted any suggestions that the formation of an armed rebellion in Krajina and Western 
Slavonia was anything but just. The conflict was forced upon the Serbs, as a result of a 
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secessionist policy driven by Slovenia and Croatia.  
 
In such conditions, natural and legitimate self-defence comes into play, peculiar to the 
historical dignity of a people. Efforts to qualify this as banditry and outlawry by a large 
and well-organized propaganda racket is the best sign of a lack of constructiveness or 
ability on the part of a chauvinist and pro-fascist concept, to the cost of interests and 
dignity of a people and their just struggle for civil and national equality. Furthermore, 
protagonists of the banditry and outlawry epithet overlook the fact that one cannot be a 
bandit or an outlaw in the garden of one’s own house, on the door-step of one’s home.111 
 
In July 1991, Miloševi issued a special statement on government controlled  RTV 
Belgrade. At this time, efforts were still going on to negotiate a solution to the future of 
Yugoslavia. It was clear, however, that the conflict was on its way. For Miloševi, it was 
time to mobilise the masses. 
 
Therefore all those who have in mind the violence against Serb people should in their 
own interest support our commitment to peace. Therefore we now, despite the outbreak 
of war, engage in restoring peace and freedom. Nobody wants their children to die. We 
do not wish that ours or those of others will perish and that is why we engage in peace in 
both Serbia and outside Serbia. That effort is more important than every other effort. That 
is our strongest and oldest destiny. But, in order to preserve peace for tomorrow, and 
today, it is necessary that we are ready to defend it wherever Serbia, its citizens and 
Serbian people are endangered.112  
 
 
At the time this special statement was made on RTV Belgrade, Miloševi was under fire 
from home. Not only was the war in Croatia unpopular with the Serb electorate, also 
various opposition parties had jumped on the nationalist train to gain voters. Arguably, it 
became important for Miloševi to warn against alternative views on history, as can be 
seen in this excerpt. Keeping in mind the strong reluctance that the Serbs had for entering 
into war, it is interesting to note that Miloševi used this occasion to issue a stark warning 
to people whose loyalties he believed was questionable.  
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I appeal to all citizens of Serbia to be ready to defend peace. In particular, to avoid 
misuse of different interpretations of the interest of Serbian and Serbian people by those 
who use this difficult situation, and even the sorrow and pain of families, to win points 
for their political affirmation and the prestige of political parties. When it comes to 
defence, organisations and decisions concerning defence, the decisions are taken only by 
the state, and not by groups or parties. That must be the strict rule which all citizens must 
obey.113  
 
By August, it was clear that all efforts to bring about a negotiated settlement had failed. 
The EC had sent four missions, none had succeeded. On the ground, the JNA had made 
troop movements to suggest that they would attack areas in Croatia which Belgrade 
regarded as part of the Serbian homeland.114 As has been shown, the Belgrade regime 
was heavily involved in supporting the armed militia groups, led by the Serb military 
leader in Krajina, Milan Marti. A few weeks later the first village was ethnically 
cleansed by Serbian forces.  
 
At the same time, the international press took a stronger interest in the events in Croatia. 
The first Gulf War was over and the international press increasingly turned their attention 
to the events in the Balkans. The EC negotiator Hans Van den Broek had laid the blame 
for the breakdown in negotiations on Serbia. In an interview with the journalist Arnout 
Van Linden from the British TV Channel Sky News, Slobodan Miloševi denied any 
blame for the failure. The interview was subsequently published in the national 
newspaper Borba.115  
 
He also drew direct parallels to the events of August 1991 with the Second World War. 
Quizzed about the assertions from Van den Broek that politicians in the Balkans were 
more interested in the past than the present, Miloševi gave an interesting answer.  
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Van Linden: Is this your answer to what Mr van den Broek said in Belgrade, that 
politicians here are more tuned to the past than to the future? How would you reply to the 
remarks he made here in Belgrade? 
 
Miloševi: It is not good if politicians think more about the past than about the future. I 
think that we all have to turn to the future in order to solve the crisis, but we have to 
respect experiences from the past because of the future. We must not repeat the tragic 
experiences that we had in this country 50 years ago. I think that people around the world 
are not aware of the fact that we are facing a kind of restoration of fascism in this 
country. This is the first example since the Second World War that someone armed his 
own party. It was in Croatia that someone started organising paramilitary formations and 
demonstrating his sovereignty by attacking all Serbian villages and towns in the republic. 
This is something that happened in this country 50 years ago as well. You know that in 
the so-called Independent State of Croatia, during the Second World War, genocide was 
committed against Serbs. In one concentration camp alone, in Jasenovac, more than 
700,000 Serbs, Jews, Gypsies and others were killed. We are now facing a very similar 
situation. 
 
Van Linden: But that is past. You were just talking about the past. 
 
Miloševi: Yes, but this exists in some aspects of the present. There lies the problem. We 
must be aware of that experience from the past in order to be able to do everything in our 
power to prevent that tragic experience from reoccurring. We can be a happy, good and 
successful country if we overcome this crisis of nationalism and nationalist 
confrontations. Everything in Yugoslavia started when nationalists in Croatia and 
Slovenia came to power, and the simple result of that was the decision on secession. 
Everything else followed. 
 
As can be seen from these excerpts, Miloševi offered a version of history that fitted 
neatly in with his propaganda as a peacemaker. This “awareness” of the past compelled 
the Serbs to take up arms. It is also interesting to see how he refuted any claims that he is 
operating from a nationalist platform.  
 
Van Linden: They say, however, that everything began in 1987 when you became 
President of Serbia on the basis of a nationalist policy. 
 
Miloševi: That was never a nationalist platform. Why do you not face the truth? Now as 
a journalist, you can see for yourself that here in Serbia we have more than 40,000 
refugees Croatia and there is not a single refugee from Serbia in Croatia. There is no 
pressure here, no broken windows. You can see that peace reigns on every inch of 
Serbian territory. We are not in conflict with Croatia. This is not a conflict between the 
Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Croatia. This is a conflict between the Croatian 
authorities and the Serbian people. This is a kind of state terrorism against the Serbian 
population in Croatia. They are incessantly attacking villages, shelling them with 120 mm 
grenades. They have started slaughtering people. They have slaughtered a peasant in the 
village of Mirkovci. I suppose you have been informed that a woman has been 
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slaughtered in Krajina. Can you imagine something like that at the end of the 20th 
century? 
 
 
In the same interview, Miloševi argued that the Serbs throughout history have only been 
engaged in defensive battles. As such, he claimed the moral high ground as leader of 
people whose only concern is to defend their own homes.  
 
Miloševi: They [the Serbs] have never committed any aggression on the territory of 
Croatia. By the way, throughout our history, the Serbian people have never waged an 
aggressive, occupational war. We have always defended ourselves and have done so very 
successfully. We have always won. I think that no one can defeat people who are 
defending their homes. 
 
Van Linden: Are you controlling the Serbian militia in Croatia? 
 
Miloševi: No. 
 
Van Linden: Do you have any connections with them? 
 
Miloševi: We are helping them in terms of food, medical equipment, medicines, money 
and the like. We are doing a lot for them, but they are defending their own homes and no 
one has organised groups on these territories. 
 
It is interesting to note how Miloševi defended himself against the charges that he was 
controlling the Serb military forces in the Krajina. He admitted helping them with non-
military equipment, and argued that their task was to defend their own homes.  
 
At the time, it was clear that the Serbian military effort in Croatia had taken on an 
offensive nature, with the brutal siege of Vukovar. International negotiations were under 
way under the leadership of the British politician Lord Carrington. Miloševi insisted that 
Croatia should only be granted independence if Serbia could control the parts of Croatia 
with a Serb population. In practical terms, this meant annexation of those parts of 
Croatia, something Tuman could not accept. In November the same year, the American 
diplomat Cyrus Vance entered the negotiations, appointed by the UN  Secretary General. 
Towards the end of November nearly one-third of Croatia was under Serb control. At this 
time, the negotiations centred around allowing UN peace keepers on the ground. 
Publicly, Miloševi promised to fight for a just and lasting solution. The alternative 
would be genocide. Every attack on a Serbian village in Croatia was evidence that 
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genocide was returning to Yugoslavia, according to Miloševi.116  
 
In a speech during a peace conference in The Hague, Miloševi said that the international 
community has a duty to prevent genocide from re-occurring on Yugoslav soil. That is 
the fundamental claim which must be met before Serbia can sign a peace treaty for 
Yugoslavia.  
 
Finally, it is necessary to again stress that Serbs are held back in two regions under the 
sovereignty of the Croatia government which has no thought and accepts no 
responsibility for finding a solution which does not lead to continued genocide. I want to 
stress that there is a need for special protection for the remaining people who have been 
subjected to genocide, and that this is a moral duty to the international community who 
have adopted in the United Nations the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide. No other national, religious or ethnic minority on Yugoslav soil 
have been subjected to genocide or genocidal pogroms, except for Serbs, Jews and the 
Roma people. Therefore, from our deep convictions, the solution which this conference 
needs to find, can only be one which all people who live there will agree to. Only then 
can the solution be very fair and lasting. In order to resolve this, it is necessary to get a 
guarantee from the international community. It is not, therefore, a question of any 
aspirations of a ‘Greater Serbia’, but exclusively about securing basic freedom and 
security for the Serb people.117  
 
As shown here, Miloševi was appealing to the international community for help and 
support against what he calls the genocidal forces of the Croatian state. It is interesting to 
note that Miloševi at the time was warming up to the idea of allowing UN peacekeepers 
onto the soil that the Serbian forces held at the time. Arguably, by giving his strong focus 
on Serb victimhood, it was not possible for him to allow Croatian forces to take over the 
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areas held by the Serbs. This would be the case if Croatia was granted independence on 
its existing borders. The alternative was allowing UN peacekeepers forces onto Yugoslav 
soil. From the above excerpt, it seems clear that this was a scenario which he was now 
preparing his people for.  
 
A few weeks after the Hague speech was held, Serbia marked the 50th anniversary of the 
start of the uprising against the German occupiers in autumn 1941. In his speech, 
Slobodan Miloševi emphasised the role played by Serbia in fighting the Nazi occupiers. 
It was the memory of that bloody struggle which haunted the Serbs, and threatened to 
again throw the country back into a similar struggle, this time against the Croatian forces.  
 
Unfortunately the ghost of fascism is knocking on our doors. It is difficult to 
acknowledge that fascism has a chance of returning to life in this country which was 
among the first to heroically rise up against it [.....]. Therefore, the absurd fascism and its 
announcements in our country are hard to explain.118  
 
He lamented the “historical absurdities” that a new generation had to face up to a rise of fascism:  
 
Therefore, in 1991, instead of celebrating a half century of uprising and fighting against 
fascism, and admire the heroic fight against it, we, unfortunately, have to warn with anger 
and pain against the dangers of its rehabilitation. Those are the historical absurdities and 
historical injustices that only with difficulty can be accepted. And despite this, we cannot 
celebrate a generation that has fought against fascism, and today, instead of celebrating – 
we have to fear and again mobilise their children and grandchildren [of this generation] to 
a fight which has been fought before.119  
 
At the time this speech was held, the Croatian war was coming to an end. Cyrus Vance 
had just before New Year 1991 secured an agreement, in which a United Nations 
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Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was established. It formed a line between the Serb-held 
areas from the rest of the republic.120 
 
The peace agreement provoked a crisis within the leadership of the Krajina Serbs. The 
leaders which had armed themselves against the Croats with support from Belgrade, now 
had to agree to lay down their arms, see the JNA leave their areas and a UN force take 
over. For the leader Milan Babi, this was too much. He argued that if Bosnia also 
seceded, there would be no link between the Serbs in Krajina, and Serbia proper.121 
 
But Slobodan Miloševi had no plans to change his mind. In a public storm battle against 
Babi, he made sure there was no doubt about who was the supreme leader of the Serbian 
people. Again, the genocide scenario is used. At this stage, UNPROFOR was the 
guarantor against genocide and Milan Babi has no right to intervene in order to secure 
the privileges of keeping the armed forces of Serbian Krajina. In an open letter published 
in Borba and Politika, Miloševi delivered a crushing blow to Babi, arguing that the 
presence of the UN has as its “exclusive aim to secure peace”.122  
 
You have to know that the people have taken sacrifices in order to secure itself against 
genocide and to secure their freedom and security – but the people do not need to 
sacrifice anything because of the selfishness of a politician.123 
 
His former ally Babi had been left out into the cold. Continued armed struggle by the 
Serbian Krajina forces would only lead to more bloodshed, argued Miloševi. 
 
Tens of thousands of citizens of Serbia (not only Serbs, but all nationalities) have 
mobilised into the JNA that has defended and, which you have seen, succeeded in 
defending the Serbian people in the Krajinas and secure a lasting peace. But, at the 
moment peace is secured, and the people protected from a repetition of genocide, any 
continuation of armed conflict would represent an irresponsible disregard for human lives 
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and people’s destiny.124   
 
Miloševi also strongly dismissed any suggestion that the armed struggle carried out by 
the Krajina leaders represented the wishes of the Serbian nation. He said: “The citizens of 
Serbia are not your hostages, nor will they be.”125  
 
In many ways, the war was brought full circle as the leader of the Croatian Serbs was 
armed and supported by Belgrade, and then finally cut off politically once the hostilities 
were over.  
Summary 
The war in Croatia became a platform for Miloševi’s genocide rhetoric. He was himself 
responsible for instigating the fighting, and as such created an environment where his 
genocide rhetoric thrived. The use of genocide in his rhetoric against dissent at home also 
shows that the rhetoric was not limited to stirring up ethnic hatred. In fact, his focus on 
preserving Yugoslavia indicates that Miloševi knew that dismissal of nationalism struck 
a chord, both with his population at home and the international community. The next 
chapter will analyse the slide into war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where his rhetoric of 
moderation continued.  
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4: Bosnia - en route to genocide 
 
You want to take Bosnia-Herzegovina down the same highway of hell and suffering that 
Slovenia and Croatia are travelling. Do not think that you will not lead Bosnia-Herzegovina 
into hell, and do not think that you will not perhaps make the Muslim people disappear, 
because the Muslims cannot defend themselves if there is war - how will you prevent 
everyone from being killed in Bosnia-Herzegovina?126 
 
This stark warning from Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadži in October 1991, gives 
an indication of just how far the nationalist groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina stood from 
each other at the time war raged in Croatia. In the Vance plan had received a lukewarm 
welcome from local Serbs in Croatia, who expressed fear that they would be 
geographically cut off and isolated from Serbia if the neighbouring republic Bosnia-
Herzegovina declared independence from rump Yugoslavia. It soon became clear that the 
Serbs in Croatia had no reason to worry, as the Serb in Bosnia-Herzegovina set their sight 
on occupying large swathes of Bosnian territory providing a corridor between the 
Croatian Serbs and Serbia proper. That meant that war would come to Bosnia-
Herzegovina.  
 
Already in March 1991, Miloševi and Tuman met on Marshal Tito’s old hunting lodge 
in Karadjordjevo. Here the leaders, who a few months later technically would be at war 
with each other, discussed their territorial ambitions in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the multi-
cultural republic no ethnic group formed the majority, and its cities were thriving 
examples of the Yugoslav ideal of brotherhood and unity.127 The nationalist re-orientation 
in Croatia and Serbia had by 1991 changed this dramatically. Openly Miloševi had 
stated his goals of having all Serbs in one state, and Tuman dreamed of a Croatian 
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homeland.128 It was only natural, according to the prevailing ideology, that they also had 
ambitions for the Croatian and Serb minorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In fact, Serb and 
Croat nationalist leaders both expressed the view that the Muslims were Croats or Serbs 
who had succumbed to pressure and converted to Islam during Ottoman rule.129  
 
During the Karadjordjevo talks, the two leaders both formulated an agreement to carve up 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, with no regard to the republic’s Muslim population and the people 
who supported the republic’s multi-ethnic tradition.  
 
In 1990 the three largest groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina had established political parties 
along ethnic lines. Alija Izetbegovi, who had been jailed by the Yugoslav authorities for 
his support for an expanded role of Islam, founded the Party for Democratic Action 
(SDA). He called for a continuation of Yugoslavia, but only as a confederal state with 
sovereign nations and republics with the current borders.130 In other words, a confederal 
solution which Slobodan Miloševi had opposed in the negotiations prior to the Croatian 
war. 
 
The Serbs followed suit and founded the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) in July 1990, as a 
branch of the Serbian Croat party in Knin, Croatia. The psychiatrist Radovan Karadžic 
from Montenegro was elected its leader. The political platform had an emphasis on 
protection of the Serb nation. It was said to be disadvantaged by the purported lower birth 
rate of Serbs and by the way Bosnia-Herzegovina had been divided into municipalities, 
effectively making Serbs an ethnic minority in areas where they might otherwise have 
dominated.131 As we shall return to, this became an important part of the Serb propaganda 
machinery during the war. The Croats followed up, and created a Bosnian wing of the 
ruling HDZ party in Croatia.  
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In the 1990 elections the Bosnian population voted for the party which represented their 
ethnic group. At this stage, however, the parties were more intent on keeping the 
communists out, than fighting each other. Consequently, the parties formed an uneasy 
alliance in the Bosnian government. 
 
But the three election winning parties had conflicting ideas of what Bosnia-Herzegovina 
should do in the event of Slovenia and Croatia leaving the federation. The Croat HDZ 
party wanted essentially to take what it could of Bosnia-Herzegovina with a Croat 
population and make it a part of an independent Croatia. The SDS wanted to remain in 
Yugoslavia, knowing that it had the backing of Belgrade. Ironically, the party called for a 
confederation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the same arrangement it had opposed as a solution 
for Yugoslavia. The Muslim SDA, led by Alija Izetbegovi opted for a sovereign but 
multi-ethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina. In a speech to the Bosnian Parliament in February 
1991, Izetbegovi said that he was ready to fight: ‘I would sacrifice peace for a sovereign 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, but for that peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina I would not sacrifice 
sovereignty.’132  
 
The war in Croatia brought the political alliance in Bosnia-Herzegovina to an end. The 
HDZ and SDS threw their support behind the Croats and Serb respectively, and Aljia 
Izetbegovi came down on the side of both Slovenia and Croatia. Hence, the political 
crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina escalated, and the question of Bosnian sovereignty became 
acute. The Serbs established so-called Serbian autonomous regions (SAO) with armed 
checkpoints.133 In small plebiscites, the SDS asked Serbs in Bosnia to back the party’s 
policy on keeping Bosnia-Herzegovina in Yugoslavia. But Izetbegovi did not waver in 
his call for independence. As leader of the Bosnian presidency he was left with the choice 
of staying in a rump Yugoslavia, and face the same situation as the Albanians in Kosovo 
who had lost their autonomy under Slobodan Miloševi’s first years in power, or risk war 
by declaring independence. On 20 December, 1991, the Bosnian presidency voted to seek 
independence, with the Serb representatives voting against.134 What the Serbs had 
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regarded as a war cry, had become a reality. The slide into war seemed inevitable.  
 
At the same time, the old system of strict balance between the different national groups 
crumbled in municipalities across Bosnia-Herzegovina, and people from minority ethnic 
groups were excluded.135 In essence, this was a bureaucratic ethnic cleansing and a 
precursor to the horrors of war.  
 
The political crisis triggered preparations for an armed escalation. The Bosnian 
presidency that had voted for independence knew that the JNA would side with the Serbs, 
as it had done in Croatia. After the cease-fire in Croatia, weapons had poured into 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Croatian units, who had taken part in the war in Croatia, returned 
home where they anticipated war to break out. Alija Izetbegovi started to organise the 
Muslim Green Berets in autumn 1991, and the Patriotic League became the Bosnian 
government’s army.136 The Serb initially relied on the JNA for their defence. Miloševi 
secretly moved all JNA officers born in Bosnia back to their native republic.137 This was 
in violation of the JNA’s strict instructions. The JNA had traditionally had a strong 
proportion of Serbs among its officers, and by the time war erupted in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the federal army had been transferred into a Serb fighting force.138 This 
made it possible for Miloševi to argue that he had done his share to prevent the fighting, 
by pulling out the JNA.  
 
A report by JNA General Milutin Kukanjac stated that the “leadership of Serbian people 
and all Serbs are ready for the war, in the case that the confederation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is not accepted”. It went on to describe how the JNA had distributed 17298 
weapons to so-called “volunteer units” in the 2nd Military District. In total, evidence from 
the ICTY show that the Serbs armed themselves in 28 municipalities in Bosnia-
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Herzegovina.139  Consequently, it can be argued that Slobodan Miloševi pulled strings 
which would lead to war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
 
A national referendum on the future of the republic was held on 29 February to 1 March, 
and boycotted by Serbs. The official result showed that 63 per cent voted in favour of 
independence, but for the Serbs the referendum was seen as another step toward war.140  
The following day road blocks were set up by Serb irregulars in Sarajevo. Large peace 
rallies were held in both Sarajevo and Mostar, but by the end of the first week of March, 
it was clear that the slide into war could not be stopped. Izetbegovi ordered full 
mobilisation of all police forces and reservists in Sarajevo, and the SDS called for Serbs 
to leave the city.141  
 
By April, fighting had erupted in almost all of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Croatian and Muslim 
units tried to block the advance of the far stronger JNA, which by now was a Serb 
fighting force. The first massacre happed in Bijelijina on 2 – 3 April, and was carried out 
by the feared Serb paramilitary leader, Željko Raznjatovi, also known as Arkan.142  
Days after the European Community (EC) and the USA recognised Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
a full-scale invasion of eastern Bosnia was carried out by JNA and Serb irregular forces. 
The invasion was followed by waves of ethnic cleansing.143 
 
General Ratko Mladi was made head of the army of the Serb republic in May. The 
shelling of Sarajevo started and Serb forces tried, and failed, to divide Sarajevo in early 
May. When a bread queue in Sarajevo was shelled on 27 May, the UN Security Council 
passed resolution 757, imposing sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro, the two republics 
left in Yugoslavia. As we will return to later, this event created a siege mentality in 
                                                           
139
 Judgment against Momilo Krajisnik, paragraph 42, 
http://www.un.org/icty/krajisnik/trialc/judgement/kra-jud060927e.pdf, accessed, 5 September 2007. 
140
 Burg and Shoup 1999:  p 117. 
141
 Burg and Shoup 1999:  p 129. 
142
 A report prepared by the prosecution at the ICTY states that the share of non-Serbs in the Republika 
Srpska in Bosnia fell by 82 per cent from 1991 to 1997. Burg and Shoup 1999:  p 119. 
143
 The Report on Ethnic Composition and Displaced Persons and Refugees also show that the share of 
non-Serbs in the Federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina increased by 41 per cent. Accessed on 5 September, 
2007 from the judgment in the case against Biljana Plavši, paragraph 36, 
http://www.un.org/icty/plavsic/trialc/judgement/pla-tj030227e.pdf, accessed: 12 September 2007. 
  
52 
Serbia that Slobodan Miloševi exploited in his political campaign.  
 
The Croat defence council HVO were led by Mate Boban and in the initial stages it was 
allied with the Bosnian Muslims against the Serb onslaught. This alliance lasted until 
1993, when fighting between them broke out. The attack on Mostar that year, caused 
outrage at the UN, and was followed by ethnic cleansing of villages with a Muslim 
population in the Neretva valley.144  
Genocide in Bosnia 
The previous chapter showed the important role played by genocide in the propaganda 
machinery of Slobodan Miloševi in Belgrade during the war in Croatia. The Bosnian 
Serbs followed up on this rhetoric, and argued that genocide was the only alternative to 
the policy goals of the SDS. As we shall return to, the Bosnian Serb genocide rhetoric 
was very different from that of Miloševi, who distanced himself from the fighting in 
Bosnia.  
 
The ICTY has identified four factors involved in creating a fear among Bosnian Serbs 
that Muslims and Croats would use violence against them.145 
 
1. The memory of crimes committed during The Second World War, when Bosnia-
Herzegovina also was part of the Ustaša NDH state.  
2. Muslims and Croats expressed extreme messages and hinted at the annihilation of 
Serbs in Bosnia. 
3. Armed gangs perpetrated crimes against Serbs based on ethnic motives. 
4. The leadership of the SDS encouraged the fears and made them public.  
 
The armed actions perpetrated against the Serbs did contribute to the fear, and served to 
confirm already held convictions among Serbs that there was a conspiracy against them. 
A statement signed by Bosnian Serb leader Momilo Kraijsnik about the Bosnian Serb’s 
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right to self-determination is one example of how the Bosnian Serb leaders spelled out 
the horrors of genocide as an alternative to their political strategy.   
Any other viewpoint would bring into question the national and physical survival of the 
Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, who in recent history have been exposed to 
one of the worst genocides and policies of forced resettlement in Europe.146 
There were in particular two elements involved in the creation of a fear of genocide: 
Demographic change in favour of the Muslims which would gradually force out the Serb 
population, and suggestions that the Bosnian Muslim leader, Alija Izetbegovi would 
create an Islamic state out of an independent Bosnia.  
 
Bosnian Serb leaders spelt out these fears in discussions with international mediators, 
which can be seen in a conversation between SDS leader Radovan Karadži, US 
ambassador Herbart Okun and mediator Cyrus Vance.  
He continued by saying that the genocide during the Second World War had reduced the 
Serb numbers, the Serb population in Bosnia. He asserted that before The Second World 
War that Serbs constituted 44 per cent of the population of Bosnia, whereas in the 1981 
and 1991 census, they had about 31 or 32 per cent. He continued by saying that he 
wanted -- that the Muslims wanted all of Bosnia and that they expected to achieve it via 
their high birth rate, by a demographic means, because there were more Bosnian Muslims 
than there were Bosnian Serbs.147 
The demographic argument was put into an Ottoman context. The uprising against the 
Ottoman rulers had provided the backbone of the creation of a Serb nationalism in the 
19th century. Bosnia-Herzegovina had undergone an islamization under Ottoman rule.148 
As we have seen earlier, the period of Ottoman occupation is in Serb history referred to 
as a dark age and an obstacle to the natural development of Serbia as a nation state.149  
 
This thesis will refer to use of a demographic factor as a largely fabricated “demography 
myth”. This myth was embraced by Slobodan Miloševi, but also by the leadership in 
                                                           
146
 Quoted document is from 19 December 1991. Excerpt found in witness statement from Patrick Treanor 
in the trial against Momilo Kraijsnik at ICTY, p 1504, http://www.un.org/icty/transe39/040224IT.html, 
accessed: 4 september, 2007.  
147
 Transcript from the Krajisnik trial, pp 4163-4164, ICTY.  
148
 For more on this islamization see  Malcolm 1996: pp 51- 69. 
149
 Lecture given by Aleksa Djilas at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Oslo, 
Norway, 12 May 2004. 
  
54 
Croatia. In the trial against Slobodan Miloševi at the ICTY, the statement of the current 
Croatian president, Stjepan Mesi, provides an interesting insight into the dissemination 
of this myth. Mesi was in the years preceding the war the Croatian member of the 
Yugoslav presidency, and an ally of Franjo Tuman.150 In a meeting in Miloševi’s 
office, the Serbian president laid out the demographic consequences if Yugoslavia would 
disappear, backed up by evidence from “demographic experts”. They argued that if 
Yugoslavia disappeared, the national and ethnic composition of the country would be 
radically changed as one could expect the return of 500,000 Muslims who had left the 
country. Mesi’s testimony provides a unique insight into how these demographic myths 
were shared by both the Serbian and Croatian leaderships.  
 
Mesi: To support this view, he provided a document, documents and reports, which were 
elaborated and compiled by the greatest demographic experts. I took a look at those 
documents, but my only comment to them was that I think that Turkey – I said that 
Turkey has a sufficiently high growth rate, and it seemed to me improbable that 500,000 
Turks and Muslims would return. But President Tudjman took all these documents with 
him and took them back to Zagreb. 
Prosecution: Did President Tudjman appear to have approve of the contents of these 
reports or not? 
Mesi: He didn't comment much. He read some passages out loud, read through some 
others and took the documents to Zagreb. And when we met in Zagreb, when the leaders 
met in Zagreb, he took out all these documents and all he said was, "Here you have world 
experts and their views, and they stress that if Yugoslavia were to disappear, 500.000 
Muslims who had previously left Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, et 
cetera, and Sandzak, the Sandzak area, the part of the Sandzak which is in Serbia, that 
they would return." He did not give the document to anybody else to read. He did not say 
that this was compiled by the people who lived in Belgrade or, rather, that they were Serb 
experts. He said that they were 10 world experts. So he lent that material a bit more 
importance by doing so.151 
The fact that Tuman brought these documents to Croatia is perhaps not relevant to its 
use in Serbia. It is, however, an indication how the leadership dealt with so-called 
scientific facts in Belgrade, although as the next chapter will show, a fundamentally 
different picture was presented to the public.  
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The Islamist threat 
Bosnia’s Ottoman past became a major focus point for the Serb propaganda machine 
during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As mentioned, nationalist Croats and Serbs 
viewed the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina as either Croats or Serbs who had 
succumbed to pressure from the Ottoman over-lordship and converted to Islam. They had 
abandoned their true faith, and adopted an alien culture.152 The Muslims in Bosnia de-
emphasised ethnicity, and were therefore considered as weaker, with a constructed 
identity, while the Serbian and Croatian nationalisms were perceived as primordial.153 
 
This contempt, which arguably bordered on racism, was used as a rationale for the 
Serbian expansion in the republic.154  Furthermore, the Bosnian Serb leadership 
disseminated a view that the Muslims constituted a religious threat. The Bosnian Serb 
propaganda machinery widely used references to the region’s Ottoman past. In 1992, 
journalist Roy Gutman visited the Bosnian Serb stronghold of Banja Luka, to investigate 
Bosnian Serb propaganda. One example is this Bosnian Serb text: 
 
“By order of the Islamic fundamentalists from Sarajevo, healthy Serbian women from 17 
to 40 years of age are being separated out and subjected to special treatment. According 
to their sick plans going back many years, these women have to be impregnated by 
orthodox Islamic seeds in order to raise a generation of janissaries on the territories they 
surely consider to be theirs, the Islamic republic.155 In other words, a fourfold crime is to 
be committed against the Serbian woman: to remove her from her own family, to 
impregnate her by undesirable seeds, to make her bear a stranger and then to take him 
even away from her.”156  
 
There were suggestions that the dissemination of such propaganda contributed to some of 
the most horrific war crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, namely the use of mass rape. The 
focus on the demographic threat allegedly created, and justified, among some Bosnian 
Serbs soldiers a collective feeling of revenge which resulted in the rape of Muslim 
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women.157  
 
The Islamophobic nature of Bosnian Serb propaganda also characterised the description 
of the Bosnian president Alija Izetbegovi. He was the only Bosnian leader who had 
never been a communist. Rather he was a deeply religious Muslim, who spent his career 
working as a lawyer in Sarajevo. During the war, he had been a member of Mladi 
Muslimani, young Muslims, who nurtured ties with the youth movement of the Nazi 
puppet Ustaša regime in the Independent state of Croatia (NDH).158 In 1973 he wrote the 
Islamic Declaration, which argued for a stronger role of Islam in public and political life.  
Nationalists in Croatia and Serbia took this as a sign that he planned to create a Muslim 
state in Bosnia-Herzegovina.159 Izetbovi, however, dismissed any suggestion that this 
was his goal. In fact, the Islamic Declaration excluded the use of violence in the creation 
of a Muslim state, and was a work of scholarship than politics.160 He argued that Bosnia-
Herzegovina was a multicultural secular society, and that Muslims could not lay claim to 
the role of titular nationality in Bosnia.161 In 1983 he was arrested again for distributing 
the Islamic Declaration, and sentenced once again to three years in prison.  
 
Izetbegovi religious platform was controversial also within his own party, which was 
divided into conservative and liberal wings. The conservatives meant that a Bosnian state 
was bound up with the affirmation of the Muslims as a nation. Partition of Bosnia-
Herzegovina could be discussed, but they never excluded the reconquest of part of Serb-
occupied Bosnia at a later date. The smaller liberal wing saw Bosnian statehood as a way 
of preserving the republic’s multi-cultural traditions.162 In other words, the Muslims of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina were divided on the subject of which role religion should play in a 
future state.  
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Trouble at home 
In Serbia, Miloševi was facing dissent on the streets.163 Demonstrators were calling for 
his resignation, and peace activists mourned publicly the siege of Sarajevo.164 With the 
discontent spreading, Miloševi appointed the moderates Dobrica osi and Milan Pani 
to the federal presidency. osi had been a well-respected member of the Serbian 
Academy of Arts and Sciences (SANU), and played an important part in the nationalist 
re-orientation in Serbia in the late 1980s. He had supported Miloševi but opposed his 
autocratic rule. Pani was an industrialist who had made big money in the United 
States.165 These appointments were welcomed by the Serbian opposition, but did little to 
change the political landscape in Serbia. Pani was considered politically naive and 
dismissed by Miloševi by the end of that year. osi was considered to be one of few 
people who could pose a challenge to Miloševi, and had rejected aggressive nationalism. 
He was, however, not willing to challenge him for the presidency in 1992, despite his 
broad support at home and abroad.166 
 
Miloševi knew that the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was not popular in Serbia, and this 
was reflected in his speeches directed at the opposition. Confronted with his critics, 
Miloševi chose the same approach has he had while the war was raging in Croatia; only 
unity can save the Serbs.  
 
In June 1992, Miloševi met a delegation of University students and professors who 
called for him to step down. The president’s defence was simple: Those who sided 
against the government took the side of the West who had exerted unjust pressure on 
Serbia. 
 
Against that pressure, the answer to the solution can only be a unification of all forces in 
Serbia, to treat Serbia well, and not, unfortunately, that somebody stand on the side of 
this foreign pressure. It is absolutely clear that nobody can destabilise Serbia by foreign 
pressure.167 
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This call for unity was repeated in a speech to a democratic opposition group a few weeks 
later.168 
 
The response to domestic criticism is important for the argument of this thesis because it 
shows the way Miloševi raised the stakes involved in the conflict. Commenting on the 
war directly, he denied any involvement and stated that propaganda machinery was 
targeting Serbia. He thereby used the role of Serbs as victims of “foreign pressure” to 
clamp down on opposition at home. 
Summary 
Late 1991 and early 1992 saw the failure of international efforts to prevent war in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. As in Croatia, the Serb population had created their own self-
proclaimed state-let within a state on the road to independence. This was partly based on 
a disseminated fear of genocide, which was used particularly by the Bosnian Serb 
leadership. Also, strong anti-Islamic sentiments were present in what became known as 
the Republika Srpska (RS). In Serbia, however, people protested in the streets against the 
war. Slobodan Miloševi responded by urging unity among all Serbs, against “foreign 
enemies”. Miloševi defined his enemies not by opposing national or religious groups, 
but rather anti-Serbian forces from abroad. As such, it was already clear in the first 
months of the Bosnian War that Miloševi chose a different profile in his public 
propaganda than the Bosnian Serbs. However, his focus on the victimisation of the Serbs 
continued. The next chapter will show how Miloševi publicly presented himself as a 
peacemaker. His rhetoric on genocide continued however, but increasingly the 
international community was seen as the perpetrators through genocidal sanctions. This 
feeling of an international threat grew stronger as sanctions were imposed on Serbia. In 
Miloševi’s propaganda, it was the sanctions regime that was genocidal in its nature. 
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5: Miloševi in denial  
In Belgrade, Slobodan Miloševi had played the role of a peacemaker throughout the 
Croatian war, despite massive evidence that he was indeed controlling the warring parties 
on the Serb side in Croatia. The mobilisation drive, he argued, was driven by a desire to 
save the Serbs from the so-called genocidal forces in Croatia. As shown previously, he in 
fact admitted supporting the Croatian Serbs, although not militarily.169 In Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Miloševi denied accusations that the Serbs were carrying out any acts of 
aggression. As the shelling of Sarajevo brought the horrors of war into the focus of the 
international community, Miloševi claimed that Serbia was a victim of a formidable 
propaganda machinery aimed at weakening the Serbs. 
 
With war looming in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Serbian president refuted any claims that 
he was in control of the Bosnian Serbian forces that was carrying out the violence. This 
chapter will look at how Miloševi denied any involvement in the conflict in Bosnia in 
the first months of the war, and how his portrayal of Serbs as victims gradually solidified 
as the international community increased its pressure against Serbs over the atrocities 
carried out in Bosnia. When he addressed the nation, Miloševi emphasised the Serb’s 
historical struggle against genocide in both Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. But the 
imagery was different from Croatia, in that he largely refrained from depicting the 
Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian army as forces ready to commit genocide. Instead, he 
stressed Serbia’s efforts to bring a negotiated end.  
 
Whereas the war in Croatia had been triggered by the threat facing the Serbs, the war in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina was presented as a more irrational struggle. During spring and 
summer 1992, Miloševi argued that the war itself was absurd, not only the allegations 
that Serbia was in control. In fact, Miloševi speeches suggest that he fought against a 
rationale presented by the Western media, that the Serbs were the aggressors in the war. 
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Arguably, this allowed Miloševi to distance himself from the fighting on the ground, 
and that the conflict was a civil war, detrimental to all three nationalities. At the same 
time, Miloševi could maintain his focus on victimhood, which in Croatia took the form 
of imminent genocide. The UN sanctions of May 30 1992, however, made it necessary 
for Miloševi to explain why he could not cut off relations with the Bosnian Serbs. 
Pressed on this issue in a long interview with Serbian TV in October, Miloševi returned 
to the issue of genocide and pledged never to cut off, or reduce, the aid to the Bosnian 
Serbs.  
 
The peacemaker 
By April 1992, Miloševi had to explain the violence carried out by Serbs outside of 
Serbia, both to the Serbs at home and the international community. Again, the preferred 
subject of his speeches was the victimisation of the Serbs. In order to analyse the way the 
message was sold, I have identified three traits: 
 
1. The foreign media is conducting a campaign against Serbia.  
2. UN sanctions against Yugoslavia are deeply unfair. 
3. Those who opposed Miloševi at home sided with the “foreign pressure”.  
 
The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina cast a shadow on the political scene in Belgrade. As we 
have looked at before, Serbian president Slobodan Miloševi aimed to present himself as 
a peacemaker during the war in Croatia. The argument from Belgrade was that the 
conflict had been caused by the rehabilitation of a fascist past, and the only option open 
for the Croatian Serbs was to defend themselves from a coming genocide. When the war 
reached its conclusion with the Vance plan, Slobodan Miloševi argued that the 
UNPROFOR forces could do the job of protecting the Serbs from genocide, and publicly 
humiliated the Croatian Serb leaders who wished to keep their arms. Miloševi had 
secured peace for the entire Serb nation, he said.  
In spring 1992, with war looming in Bosnia-Herzegovina, his peace rhetoric continued. 
The federal army JNA began to withdraw from Bosnia in late April, but as we examined, 
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this happened only after military personnel had been transferred to Bosnia. They 
numbered around 80 000 personnel, and formed the backbone of a new Bosnian Serb 
army.170 At the same time, senior officers who had refused to support Radovan Karadži 
in the initial stages of the war were purged.171 But the preparations for war that the 
Miloševi government were carrying out, was clandestine business for the ruling 
regime.172 Publicly, Belgrade pursued peace.  
 
In a speech to the Serbian parliament at the end of February 1992, Slobodan Miloševi 
laid out his political aims in advance of the outbreak of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He 
praised the international community for contributing UN troops to Croatia, but at the 
same warned that the pressure from some European countries upon Yugoslavia was 
strengthening.  He defined three aims for his government: 
 
Security and safety for the political and physical integrity of the Serbia people who live 
outside of Serbia; preservation of Yugoslavia as a joint state; efforts to bring a peaceful 
solution to the Yugoslav crisis, in accordance with our known attitude that the Yugoslav 
crisis should be solved peacefully and not by war.173  
 
By April, full-scale war had engulfed Eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina. The international 
press started broadcasting on the plight of the people of Bosnia, and in Sarajevo in 
particular. Miloševi had to face up to criticism that his government supported those 
elements that were driving Bosnia into civil war. In a press conference after a meeting 
with international mediator Lord Carrington, Miloševi refuted any suggestions that the 
Serbs were carrying out an invasion of Eastern Bosnia. He further stated that “we cannot 
understand the great pressure and accusations that Serbia has invaded Bosnia-
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Herzegovina”.174 
 
He explained that the fighting in Bosnia is a result of “mutual killings” which is hurting 
all three nationalities in the region. This fighting had to end, he said, and this was also an 
attitude that is known to the international community.  
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Serb irregular forces were at the time carrying out 
atrocities against the Bosnian population. Again, Miloševi denied the reports:  
 
What concerns the possibility that there are irregular forces, groups, individuals coming 
from Serbia, I can say openly that the institutions of the Serbian government alone 
control the entire territory of Serbia and that there are no possibilities that any groups or 
individuals, whom they might be, is causing any damage in this regard.175  
 
Victims of foreign propaganda 
As opposed to the first months of warfare in Croatia, Miloševi did not issue a public 
declaration of support for the Serbs in Bosnia.176 Neither did he claim categorically that 
the Serbs were victims of genocide in Bosnia, as the Bosnian Serb leader insisted. But it 
became more difficult to play the role of peacemaker as the evidence grew of Serbian 
involvement in the war. Miloševi responded by claiming that the mounting accusations 
against Serbia were not evidence of Serbian involvement, but proof that a massive media 
campaign is targeting Serbia. In other words, Miloševi seized upon the criticism against 
Serbia as an opportunity to portray the Serbs as victims, this time of an international 
media campaign. This can be seen in a statement he made to journalists in April, 2004: 
 
These untruths are disseminated through a very well organized media war, a propaganda 
war which is very well organised and very well paid. You have seen how even the crimes 
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committed and casualties taken in Croatia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina, according to many 
sources of information, were carried out by some Serbian irregular forces and the blame 
laid on Serbia and the Serbs. 177 
 
In mid-May Miloševi is interview by the Italian newspaper Corriera della Sierra. The 
interview is also published in Borba and Politika. This time, Miloševi was asked 
directly about his territorial ambitions. 
  
At no moment have I supported a Greater Serbia and I emphasise always that Serbia has 
no territorial ambitions against others.178 
 
Miloševi is also questioned about the meeting with Croat leader Franjo Tuman 
regarding a carve up of Bosnia, which he called a “naked lie”.179   
 
With horrors of the shelling of Sarajevo unfolding, the UN Security Council in late May 
convened to debate possible stronger economic sanctions against Serbia. Miloševi 
stepped up his rhetoric, and elaborated on what he called the defensive nature of the 
Serbian national liberation struggle. Also he re-iterated Serbia’s right to self-
determination saying that Serbia has “no masters abroad and wish to secure its 
independence”.180 
 
Regarding this matter, it is known that throughout history, Serbs and the Serbian nation 
has not fought any aggressive wars, but only defensive ones and has succeeded to keep its 
freedom and independence.181 
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Interestingly, Miloševi not only denied Serbian involvement in the crisis. He also 
blames the whole conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina on a “misunderstanding”:  
 
The situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina shows that many of those who exert pressure 
regarding the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, simply do not understand neither 
Yugoslavia’s problems, nor those of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This misunderstanding is 
pushing the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina to this bloody conflict which represents a 
tragedy for all the inhabitants, regardless of nationality.182  
 
 
In August 1992, the ghosts of the Second World War again haunted Serbia. This time, 
however, the Serbs were the ones who had to face accusations of using methods 
previously only employed by the Nazi forces in Europe. During the two first weeks of 
August, media attention was directed towards the discovery of Bosnian Serb run 
detention centres in Bosnian. The footage of emaciated prisoners behind barbed wire 
drew comparisons to the holocaust. Although an Amnesty International report in October 
proved that all three sides operated detention camps, the majority were Serbs.183 The 
international condemnation of Serbia increased. Slobodan Miloševi, however, regarded 
also these reports as naked lies, concocted by the West. In an article headlined “false 
news to the world”, Miloševi argued called the report “slanderous”, and a new chapter in 
the vilification of the Serbs in the Western press.184  
 
The UN against Serbia 
By the end of May 1992, violence had escalated in the whole region. Ratko Mladi had 
been made commander of the Bosnian Serb republic army on 20 May, and the following 
days both a Red Cross and a UN convoy were attacked. The same week inhabitants of the 
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Kozarac village near Banja Luka were massacred. The UN attributed the attacks on 
Mladi.185  On May 27, scores of civilians were killed in the bread queue massacre. 
 
These events triggered mass condemnation across the world. An effective image was 
portrayed of innocent civilians in Sarajevo, shelled from Serbian position in the hills 
around the city. On 30 May, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 757 imposing 
sanctions against the former Yugoslavia. 186 Serbia was regarded as a main aggressor.187  
 
Unsurprisingly, this strengthened Miloševi claim that an international propaganda 
machinery was directed against Serbia. A week after the sanctions were imposed, 
Miloševi gave an interview with journalist Michael Kaufman of the New York Times, 
also published in Politika. In the interview he re-iterated the position that there was a 
media campaign against Serbia. He also said that the international media ignored the fact 
that he had deplored the mortar attack on a bread queue in Sarajevo, which triggered the 
sanctions. In plain words, he left no doubt about how the Serbs were vilified in Western 
media: "We are just criminals, we are wild aggressive people, we are black devils, I don't 
know what."188 
Reaching out to Muslims 
As shown in the previous chapter, the Bosnian Serb leadership regarded the ambition of 
the Bosnian government with deep suspicion, bordering on racism. The Muslims in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina were seen as Serbs who had converted to Islam during the Ottoman 
age, and did not fulfil the criteria of a nation. A logical consequence of this is that their 
national aims could not be considered legitimate. 
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Miloševi publicly chose a very different approach. In his reference to the Serb 
nationhood, he rarely mentioned any demographic threat from the Muslims, although 
evidence shows that this was a topic of discussion with the Bosnian Serb leaders. On the 
contrary, in his speeches Miloševi aimed to portray himself as a moderate, reaching out 
to Muslims. This is evident in a letter to the Conference of Islamic countries in Istanbul 
from 18 June 1992. The letter opened by Miloševi which stated, “Serbs and Muslims are 
brothers”.189 He further repeated the denials that Serbs were guilty of any aggression in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.  
 
In Bosnia there is a civil war, and no aggression from Serbia. In that war no one side are 
innocent. Innocent are only the civilian population, Muslims, Serbs and Croats. Wars like 
these have no winners, only victims.190  
 
As opposed to his rhetoric in Croatia, Miloševi to some extent acknowledge the 
sufferings of the other side, namely Bosnian Muslims, in Bosnia. This is done through 
acknowledging that Serbia has received “tens of thousands of Muslim refugees from 
Bosnia-Herzegovina - men, women, children, old people who in Serbia were accepted 
like brothers in need.”191 
 
This letter, published in Politika on 19 June, 1992, was sent amid strong international 
criticism of Serbia, especially for the shelling of Sarajevo. It provides an interesting 
insight into how Miloševi aimed to portray himself as a bridge builder between the 
different nationalities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. His emphasis on brotherhood between the 
Serbs and Muslims echoed Tito’s ethos of Brotherhood and unity among the national 
groups which constituted Yugoslavia. It also provides a striking contrast to the warfare in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the anti-Muslim rhetoric of the Bosnian Serb leaders.  
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On several occasions, Miloševi dismissed any suggestion that he was pursuing a 
nationalist agenda. It could be argued that this applied only to Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and not to the region of Kosovo. After all, Miloševi had risen to power on 
a nationalist platform, and it had been his number one priority to end the plight of the 
Kosovo Serbs by withdrawing Kosovo’s autonomy. However, during the war in Bosnia-
Herzegovina he referred to the situation in Kosovo from a political and not ethnic 
perspective. During his rise to power, one of his key arguments had been that the 
Albanian majority in Kosovo aimed to break away from Yugoslavia and that the Serbs 
living in the region would be at the risk of genocide. In an interview with Greek TV, 
published in Politika 30 August 1992, Miloševi repeated the concern of an independent 
Kosovo, but re-iterated that this had nothing to do with any nationalist platform. “All 
Muslims in Kosovo are against the break-away of Kosovo”, he said.192 As such, the 
secessionist forces in Kosovo could not be isolated to one national or ethnic group. 
Rather, he defined the enemy as more abstract forces of secession, and not an ethnic 
group. The theme of this thesis chapter is Bosnia-Herzegovina and not Kosovo. Yet, the 
fact that he mentioned this in an interview during the Bosnian war shows the extent to 
which he went to distance himself from charges of nationalism. More importantly, it 
shows that Miloševi went beyond national identity when defining friends and foes. This 
was the case when Milan Babi was reprimanded and publicly humiliated for not 
supporting Miloševi. As the next chapter will show, the same also applied to the 
Bosnian Serb leadership after the Belgrade-Pale split.  
 
In the same interview, Miloševi also returned to the issue of genocide against the Serbs 
in Croatia. They had “never fought a war over borders, but only for their security. And 
nothing else,” he emphasised. 193  The article which carried the Greek interview in the 
Serb newspaper Politika was headlined “Serbs do not fight over borders, only against 
genocide”.194  
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Addressing the nation 
As shown earlier, Slobodan Miloševi insisted that the warfare in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
was beyond his control. However, that did not explain why it was impossible for Serbia 
to abide by the conditions for the lifting of UN sanctions, which was a cessation of all aid 
to the warring parties.195  
 
In October 1992, Miloševi gave a 80 minute long interview to the government 
controlled Radio-televizijia Srbije (RTS). It was one of Miloševi most important 
addresses that year, and was published over two pages in Politika the following day. Also 
the newspaper Borba printed transcripts of the interview.  
 
Asked about the “great pressure” which the international community had put on Serbia, 
Miloševi explained why the country must stay the course.  
 
I believe we can surmount the difficulties only if we insist on the political lines which we 
have followed. [These lines] have succeeded, despite an enormous pressure from abroad 
and despite the interior effort there have been against the existence of Yugoslavia, to 
preserve Yugoslavia and its continuity. Also you talked about the Serbian Krajina and or 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and here our goal is to aid both the Serbian people in the Krajina 
and in Bosnia to enter into fair negotiations by asking that their legitimate representatives 
participate in finding a solution to their future which is secure, safe, on the basic level 
which the United Nations have laid out.196  
 
This excerpt shows that Miloševi urged the political leaders in Bosnia-Herzegovina to 
enter into discussions about the future of the region, which would result in a secure future 
for the Serbs outside of Serbia.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Politika, (DCR/NBS).  
195
 The conditions which had to be met before the sanctions would be lifted are spelt out in UN resolution 
727, and can be accessed at 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/011/16/IMG/NR001116.pdf?OpenElement, 
accessed: 12 September 2007. 
196
 Author’s translation. Serbian text: Mislim da teškoe možemo prebroditi iskljuivo ako insistiramo na 
politici koju smo vodili i kojoj smo uspeli, uprkos ogromnih spolnij pritisaka i uprkos veoma snažnih 
unutrašnjih nastojanja koja su bila protiv opstanka Jugoslavije, da Jugoslaviju sauvamo, da sauvamo 
njen kontinuitet i, vi govorite o srpskim krajinama i o Bosni i Hercegovini, da paralelno pomognemo 
srpskom narodu u krajinama I u Bosni da danas može da bude jedan ravnopravan pregovara, da njegovi 
legitini predstavnici uestvuju u rešavanju njegove budunosti, da bude sigurna, zaštien, na osnovnu 
plana koji su napravile Ujedinjene nacije,’Intervju Radio-Televiziji Srbije,  9 October 1992, Politika, 
(DCR/NBS), http://www.dcwmemory.org.yu/ser/arhiv/sm/1992/291992.pdf, accessed: 10 May, 2007. 
  
69 
Safety again became a paramount issue, and again Miloševi mentioned the word 
genocide. As we have seen in this chapter, this is a frequent reference during the war in 
Croatia. The following excerpt shows a pattern familiar with the speeches during the 
Croatian war.  
 
Not only does Serbia want a political peace, but it should be evident that Serbia did not 
want a destruction of Yugoslavia, that Serbia was fighting for its protection. We stress 
that when crisis arise, the Serbian people and Serbia never have conducted aggressive 
wars, only defensive wars, and that we will know how to defend ourselves, which we in 
the end did show.197  
 
As such, Miloševi elevated the conflict to a grander scale, which was the continuous 
struggle that the Serbs were fighting for their own protection. He also talked about the 
need for sacrifice to prevent a second genocide this century. This time, however, he did 
mention who would perpetrate the genocide against the Serbs.    
 
To put it simple, in this country, which someone wishes to leave and secede in order to 
create their small nationalistic state-lets, Serbia was in favour of continuity and peace.  
Only where they again were exposed to genocide, for the second time during this century, 
was it not possible for them to die in order to restore peace.198 
 
This Serb struggle is thus paramount to the survival of the Serbian people. As such, the 
struggle itself is destined to come, but the means with which it will be fought should be 
peaceful.  
 
Accordingly, there are fundamental rights that belong to everyone. The right to self-
defence, to protect one’s country, one’s nation, and at all of this we insist that we are 
directed against finding a peaceful solution to the Yugoslav crisis.199  
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In 1992, Miloševi called it a duty to help the Bosnian Serbs. In his TV address, he made 
it clear that cutting off, or reducing aid, help was out of the question.  
 
They have no support apart from us. If we were to stop or only reduce held, they would 
find themselves in a very difficult situation. We have no right to do that. This is a part of 
our nation which we absolutely have a duty to help.200  
 
The long RTS interview shows that Miloševi stayed committed to the support of the 
Bosnian Serbs. Furthermore, he described the support of the Serbian people of Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Croatia as vital. As we shall return to in the next chapter, the Serbian 
people were split in spring of 1993, over the question of the Vance-Owen peace plan 
(VOPP). But only months before this became an issue, Miloševi said that a support for 
Serbs outside Serbia was “logical”.201  
 
In an interview with the Russian newspaper Pravda, also published in the Serbian papers 
Politika and Borba, Miloševi provided an interesting explanation of this “logic”.  
 
First of all, he argued that the international community was responsible for carrying out 
an evil deed by destroying the Yugoslav state, which had been one of the founders of the 
United Nations. Furthermore, he referred to the Second World War to explain this 
“logic”.  
The press in that country has with German pedantry divided the world between good and 
bad. ‘Good’ are those who during the Second World War sided with the fascists and lost 
the war. ‘Bad’ are those who were not with them and who won the war. Therefore, 
Yugoslavia, by that logic, needed to be destroyed, and has become the first victim of 
political vengeance.202   
 
Miloševi laid the blame on the war on an historical enemy, Germany, despite the fact 
that the country was not a permanent member of the UN Security Council who had 
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imposed the sanctions on Serbia. Russia, however, had the powers to veto the sanctions, 
but decided to go with the majority. Miloševi did not waste an opportunity to express his 
anger of Russia’s failure to stop the “genocidal” sanctions.  
 
This is not just about our historical relations and centuries-old friendship. This is about 
elementary objectivity. We could not in any case expect that Russia would take part in 
genocidal measures against the Serbian nation.203 
 
The sanctions against Serbia were, according to Miloševi, the price to pay for the 
“solidarity” with the Serbian people.  
 
It is believed to be logical that the Germans help Croats. Why then, is it not logical for 
Serbs to help Serbs? 204  
 
This “logic” that Miloševi presented in Russia, did not last long on the home front 
however. Three months later the “logic” of the aid to the Serbs seemed abandoned, as 
Miloševi temporarily cut off relations with Republika Srpska.  
Elections at home 
The long interview was given a few months before the parliamentary and presidential 
elections in December 1992. Miloševi was challenged for the presidency by the 
moderate Milan Pani. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Pani was an unorthodox 
politician who had returned to Serbia from the United States to challenge Miloševi for 
the presidency. His political message was one of peace, and finding a peaceful settlement 
to the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was top of the list in his political programme. This 
brief excerpt indicates that Slobodan Miloševi was keen to avoid a nationalist label, 
especially when confronted with moderate politicians at home.205 Regarding the war in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, he said that hoped that the war would soon end.  
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I hope that this is the beginning of the end of this war. I hope, and can say, that the 
Republic of Serbia would cordially keep up all efforts that could help bring peace. This is 
really in the interest of all those who live there, and of course, Serbs who live there. 
Everyone suffers from war. In this war there are no innocent sides. Only innocent 
victims.206 
 
This quotation indicates Miloševi’s commitment to peace, which he repeated several 
times during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It also suggests that Miloševi aimed to 
portray himself as not in the position to end the fighting in Bosnia. In this way, he 
restricted his role to one of an observer, horrified by the war. By doing so, he not only 
repeats that he is innocent against all charges of involvement. He also distanced himself 
from the aggression of the Bosnian Serbs.  
 
It is interesting to note that Miloševi emphasised a peaceful solution to the conflict, in 
particular challenged by the moderate Pani. Despite the obvious disadvantage in the fact 
that Pani spoke Serbian with an American accent, he was a real threat to Miloševi in 
the elections. In fact, at the start of the campaign in October, Pani had a favourable 
rating of 76 per cent, compared to 49 per cent for Miloševi.207  
 
Miloševi won the elections with 53 per cent of the vote, against 32 for Pani. The results 
are disputed, however, and it is considered likely that fraud influenced the result.208 
Among other restrictions, Miloševi denied Pani air time on national TV.209 
 
As we shall return to, this gap between the rhetoric of Miloševi and the actions carried 
out on the ground only became larger as the war progressed.  
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Summary  
As this chapter has shown, portraying the Serbs as victims vulnerable to genocide 
continued to figure as a main theme for Miloševi during 1992. This time, however, the 
portrayal of the perpetrators was different. During the first months of the war in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Miloševi aimed to depict himself as a peacemaker, and chose a strategy of 
denial. Pressed on the mounting evidence that Serbia was behind the war, Miloševi 
argued that the fighting served no purpose and had to end. Also the efforts to label Serbia 
an aggressor state was absurd, given Serbia’s historical records at fighting defensive wars 
in which national survival was the prime goal. As such, the focus on Serbian victimhood 
continued to figure as a theme in Miloševi speeches. But the imagery of the enemy had 
changed. Serbia was now the victims of a grand propaganda machinery from Western 
countries. Whereas “revamped ustaša” forces were threatening the Serbs in Croatia, 
Miloševi did not publicly single an enemy which could perpetrate genocide against the 
Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina.210 Neither did he go public with the so-called islamist 
threat which the Bosnian Serb leaders had formulated. In fact, Miloševi let it be publicly 
known that the Serbs and Muslims were friends, striving for peace against an undefined 
force that had led Bosnia into bloodshed. 
 
Also, UN trade sanctions against Serbia gradually began to take its toll on the Serbian 
economy. Only by severing ties with the Bosnian Serbs, could Miloševi hope to have the 
sanctions lifted. Pressed on this issue, he ruled out any reduction or cut-off in the aid to 
Bosnian Serbs. As the next chapter will show, this pledge was rendered valueless as the 
confrontations between the Bosnian Serbs and Belgrade ended in a complete break. 
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6: Breaking with the Bosnian Serbs 
The relationship between Slobodan Miloševi and the Serbs living outside Serbia was a 
key issue in the war in Croatia and the conflict which followed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
As examined, the unity and common interests of all Serbs were frequent references points 
in Miloševi speeches. The threat of genocide was directed against all Serbs. From spring 
1993, the relationship between the Bosnian Serbs and Belgrade deteriorated and moved 
into open confrontation.  
 
What effects did the breakdown of Serbian unity have on the genocide rhetoric of 
Miloševi? This chapter will approach this question by looking at Miloševi’s rhetoric 
from the rejection of the Vance-Owen peace plan (VOPP) in May 1993, to the failure of 
the Contact Group plan in August 1994.  
 
The refusal of the Bosnian Serbs to support a peace plan accepted by Miloševi was seen 
as a challenge to his authority. Serbia’s interests were to re-establish peace, and to have 
the sanctions lifted, Miloševi argued. This does not mean that Miloševi was incapable 
of stopping the war, but in public he insisted that the fighting was carried out in defiance 
of his wishes. As we shall see, Miloševi continued to talk about unity between the Serbs. 
However, he directed his wrath at those leaders who refused to accept what Miloševi 
defined as the true interest of all Serbian people. In other words, those who disobeyed the 
Serbian president acted against the interests of Serbia.211 Furthermore, a key objective in 
accepting the Vance-Owen plan, was to have the sanctions against Serbia lifted. When 
the Bosnian Serbs refused to play along to this plan, they were blamed of perpetuating the 
sanctions regime. At the same time, Miloševi could bolster his status as the leader of the 
Serbian struggle against sanctions, which he labelled genocidal.  
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Ditching Miloševi’s peace 
In order to understand the shift in Miloševi rhetoric, it is necessary to look at the events 
which brought about the split between the Bosnian Serbs and those in Serbia. 
As examined previously, suggestions of division of the Serbian people into different 
states had triggered frequent references to genocide in the public addresses of Serbian 
leaders. With the Vance-Owen peace plan in 1993, Miloševi was faced with the choice 
of continuing the war in Serbia, or bow to a newly brokered peace plan which could lift 
the crippling sanctions on the Serbian economy. The first implied status quo, supporting 
the aims of the Bosnian Serbs, while the sanctions continued and even strengthened. The 
second meant attempting to force the Bosnian Serbs to agree to give up one-third of their 
occupied territory. Miloševi chose the second option.  
 
The VOPP had been created by co-chairmen of the International Committee on the 
former Yugoslavia (ICFY), David Owen and Cyrus Vance, and was seen as the most 
comprehensive plan for a future Bosnia. The plan entailed one central Bosnian state, and 
ten provinces with substantial devolved powers. Three of these would have a Serb 
majority, three would have Muslim majority, two a Croatian majority and one would be 
mixed between Croats and Muslims. The tenth province, Sarajevo, would be a 
demilitarised zone.212 Crucially for the Muslims, it ended all Serbian and Croatian hopes 
of forming their own constituent state within Bosnia’s borders, and thus made the plan 
acceptable.213 The Croats accepted the plan out of hand, as the Croat provinces all 
bordered on Croatia. For the Serbs, accepting the plan was more controversial. Bosnian 
Serb forces controlled 70 per cent of Bosnian territory, and had to give up one-third of 
occupied land. The Serbian majority provinces in Bosnia would be cut of both from 
Serbia itself and from other provinces.214  
 
By April 1993, Miloševi accepted the plan after he had received clarifications that a 
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corridor between the Serbian lands would be controlled by Russian UN troops, and that 
decisions in the Bosnian presidency would be taken by consensus.215 That effectively 
meant that the Serbs could veto any decision.  
 
Miloševi then faced the huge task of persuading the Bosnian Serbs to sign the peace 
plan, and reduce their control of the Bosnian territory from 70 to 40 per cent.  
Privately, Miloševi argued the case that the plan would be impossible to implement, and 
that the Serbian provinces could be made into a de facto Serbian mini-state.216 Radovan 
Karadžic’s reservations were based on a fear that the plan would put the Bosnian Serbs in 
a risky position, being surrounded by international troops.217  
 
In May, the stage was set for a dramatic showdown in Greece between the Bosnian Serb 
leaders and Miloševi. The international community expected Miloševi to get Radovan 
Karadži to sign. By the end of a very long summit, Karadži was practically forced by 
Miloševi to put his signature on the paper.218 But before he would sign, Karadži 
insisted on referring the plan back to the Bosnian Serb assembly in the capital of the 
Serbian Republic, Pale, knowing the opposition there would be formidable.  
 
The signature gave the international community reason to believe that peace was coming 
to Bosnia-Herzegovina. This optimism was only to last a few days, however. In 
Republika Srpska, the leadership decided to fight the plan, calling it national suicide for 
Serbs.219 Slobodan Miloševi put down a considerable effort to sway the delegated to 
accept the plan. “You have to understand that I can't help you anymore,” Slobodan 
Miloševi said before the delegates voted to reject the Vance-Owen plan.220 
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Miloševi’s efforts were to no avail. The death knell to any hopes of ratification of the 
VOPP came as commander Ratko Mladi entered the building. He pulled up a map and 
pointed out all areas that the Bosnian Serb army would have to give up in the plan.221 The 
assembly overwhelmingly threw out the plan. Slobodan Miloševi was furious.222 In a 
referendum a week later, the Bosnian Serbs rejected the plan. 
 
The rejection of the peace plan was a humiliation for Miloševi in Serbia.223 He had 
shown weakness by not getting the Bosnian Serbs to sign, and was criticised for 
gambling with the safety of the Serbian people. The leader of the hard-line nationalist 
party, Vojislav Šešelj, called the plan a “time-bomb under Serbdom”.224  
 
The international community had failed to bring the parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina to 
peace. What they had achieved, however, was a split within the strongest side in the war 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  
Protector of national interests 
Before the crucial vote in the Bosnian Serb assembly on 5 May 1993, Miloševi argued 
that the Vance-Owen peace plan would secure the interests of the Serbian people.225 In an 
interview on state controlled RTS TV channel, he gave three reasons why they should 
accept the plan. Firstly, he argued that the fact that Bosnian Serbs had to give up territory 
did not mean that relations between the Serb provinces would be cut off. Secondly, he 
argued that the Serbs had been given a constitutional state and that decision had to be 
made by consensus, thereby giving the Serbs a veto. Finally, he argued that the plan 
would give the Serbs security, and that the Bosnian Serbs would not have to come into 
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contact with Bosnian or Croatian troops, as only UN soldiers would guard the borders. 
These provisions would secure the interest and the future of the Serbian nation, he said.  
 
I am confident that the assembly and the Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina can 
recognise what is in its rightful interest, and what is not, namely demonstrations of 
patriotism in a way which goes contrary to our true and historical, national interest of our 
people.226 
 
 
The article was published in Borba on 3 May 1993, with the headline “The parliament of 
Republika Srpska can and must accept this plan”.227 
 
The rejection prompted a quick response from Miloševi government in the form a 
governments statement: “The Government believes there is no reason to provide further 
help in the form of money, fuel, industrial materials and other goods that have been sent 
until now,"  it said.228 It is doubtful whether the restrictions were ever put out in practice, 
however, as Miloševi in 1993 refused any attempts to put monitors on the border.229  
 
Miloševi saw the rejection of the plan as an act of disloyalty from the Bosnian Serbs. 
The Serbian president was “not capable of hiding his autocratic nature. Diplomatic 
etiquette was not his trait”.230  “You cannot hold Serbia as your hostage,” Miloševi told 
the Bosnian Serb leadership.231 The leadership in Pale had acted in defiance of all of 
Serbia, which had carried the burden of sanctions because of the Bosnian Serb fighting in 
Bosnia. In a statement to the national news agency one week after the plan was rejected, 
Miloševi appealed to the Bosnian Serbs to help ease the burden of sanctions.  
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The burden of the huge help which has gone to Bosnia, and the sanctions which has been 
imposed on Serbia because of its solidarity with Serbs outside of Serbia, is difficult for 
Serbia to carry, and there is no reason to carry it if the war stops in Bosnia. Of course, we 
will not stop humanitarian aid to the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but in peacetime 
they would be able to restore the economy and take charge of their own lives.232 
 
He further urged the Bosnian Serbs to remember that the “interest of ten million citizens 
of Serbia must come first.233 As such, securing the lifting of the sanctions became a 
matter of highest national interest. Consequently, those who rejected his solution to this 
lifting of the sanctions, also acted against the interest of all Serbs. Not only were the 
Bosnian Serbs disloyal to Miloševi, they also refused to support the Serb national 
interests. Miloševi issued a threat of cutting off aid to those who believed that “the 
interests of Serbia and its citizens are second-class”.  
 
Now, Serbia must start to take care of itself, above all restore and develop its economic 
life, to lift the living standard of our citizens, and ensure that we are safe from the 
violence and criminals who are a result of the war and the large and uncontrolled 
circulation of people between the two republics. For that reason I believe that support for 
the peace plan is a genuine support for peace which is of the largest possible existential 
importance for Serbia, for its citizens, for all citizens of Serbia. Those who do not see and 
accept this, are not motivated by the interest of Serbia and the people who live there, but 
of some other personal or group interest. Therefore, nobody who, based on his own 
interests, believes that the interests of Serbia and its citizens are second-class can count 
on our understanding and our support.234  
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The above excerpt also makes it clear that the rejection of the VOPP made it possible for 
Miloševi to continue his peace rhetoric, examined in the previous chapters. Also, he 
could present himself as the undisputed leader of a common struggle facing all Serbs, 
namely the genocidal sanctions against Serbia.  
Genocidal sanctions 
Shortly after Miloševi had failed to get the Bosnian Serbs to accept the Vance-Owen 
peace plan, Mladi’s forces overran the Muslim city of Srebrenica. Almost 
simultaneously, fighting broke out between the Croats and Bosnian forces. While the 
ICFY had succeeded in bringing Slobodan Miloševi into favouring the peace plan, it had 
little effect on the fighting on the ground. Consequently, it was unlikely that the 
international community would lift the sanctions over Miloševi’s support for a peace 
plan, when this had failed to bring peace.  
 
On the diplomatic arena, there was a notable change in the approach to a diplomatic end 
to the war. Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup writes that after the Bosnian Serb rejection  
of the Vance-Owen plan, the co-chairmen of the ICFY, David Owen and Thorvald 
Stoltenberg, prepared for a plan which was closer to partition than the failed Vance-Owen 
plan.235 This happened at the same time as Croatian and Serbian forces appeared to be 
creating a situation on the ground in which partition could be presented as a fait 
accompli, as Bosnian government forces were attacked from two sides. At the same time, 
the U.S. was warming up for the idea of a lift-and-strike policy, involving an end to the 
arms embargo on the Bosnian government forces and military strikes against Serb 
military positions. The international community appeared to have lost patient with 
Miloševi’s failed diplomatic manoeuvring.  
 
By autumn 1993, Miloševi stepped up his rhetorical attacks on the sanctions regime. In 
an emotional speech at the ICFY in Geneva, Miloševi said that the sanctions were 
killing Serbian children and repeated claims that this constituted genocide against the 
Serbian people. The following excerpt is from a speech Miloševi gave to the ICFY, on 
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29 November 1993: 
 
I don’t know how you think that sanctions against Serbia can stop the war between 
Muslims and Croats. And I don’t know how you will be able to explain to your children, 
when the truth reaches them, why you have waged a war against three million of our 
children, and with what right you have threatened 12 million citizens of Europe victims 
of the last, I hope, genocide in this century.236  
 
As such, Miloševi directed his anger at the international community, for their refusal to 
lift the sanctions against Serbia. Arguably, his strong words used in this excerpt were not 
only aimed at the international community. Miloševi’s comments were published in full 
text in both Politika and Borba, and reached a wide Serbian audience. As such, it can be 
argued that Miloševi’s tough talk against sanctions also bolstered his image as the leader 
of the fight against genocidal international sanctions.  
  
The final break 
The Bosnian Serb ditching of the VOPP was only precursor to what came in the summer 
of 1994.237 At the time, the international community presented new plan by the five 
nation Contact Group.238 It entailed a division of Bosnia-Herzegovina between a 
Bosnian-Croat federation and the Bosnian Serbs.239 According to the plan, the Bosnian 
Serbs would keep 49 per cent of the territory, with the Bosnian-Croat federation 
controlling the rest. Bosnian Serb president Radovan Karadži left little doubt about how 
he regarded the plan. “I thought the maps would be a problem. But there is no problem. 
There won’t be a single Serb who would accept this,” he said.240 As it turned out, 
Karadži was wrong. Miloševi was intent having the sanctions lifted, and did not regard 
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opposition from the Bosnian Serbs as an obstacle.  In a statement after the initial Bosnian 
Serb parliament vote, Miloševi urged the delegates to consider that their “heroic struggle 
of the Serbian people” had met its goal, and that the plan was not “anti-Serb”. Neither 
could the “Muslim-Croatian federation be qualified as anti-Serb”, Miloševi continued.241 
The article appeared in Politika on 1 August, headlined “Nobody has in the name of the 
Serbian people the right to reject peace.”242 
 
One day after the Bosnian Serb assembly rejected the plan for the third time, a blockade 
was set up along the river Drina, which separated Serbia from Republika Srpska.  
This came at the same time as Miloševi launched a public showdown with the Bosnian 
Serbs, and a war of words fought in the media. In a stark warning of what was to come, 
Miloševi told Bosnian Serb vice-president Nikola Koljevi, upon their refusal to accept 
the plan: “Well, if you don’t want to talk this way, we’ll talk through the newspaper.”243 
Miloševi issued statements and gave interviews suggesting Radovan Karadži was a war 
profiteer and a criminal:  
 
Their decision to reject peace cannot be made according to any real criteria in the interest 
of the people, but only for the benefit of war profiteers and those people who have guilty 
consciences. Those who fear the time when peace will come and all the crimes will be 
revealed.244  
 
The Bosnian Serb leadership were also blamed for the genocidal sanctions against Serbia. 
Interestingly, acting under instructions from Miloševi, the Yugoslav president, Zoran 
Lili, accused the Bosnian Serbs of being responsible for the shelling of Sarajevo. As 
shown in the previous chapters, Miloševi had denied any knowledge of this taking place. 
Now, however, Lili appeared to contradict Miloševi earlier position of denial.  
 
How many times have they promised that they would not shell Sarajevo, and perpetuate 
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the agony of civilians in this city? How many times have they promised to arrest bands 
and paramilitary units which are terrorizing civilians and besmirching the honour of the 
Serbs? – They went back on their word of honour that they would halt the insane attack 
on Goražde, which led to many people being killed and resulted in the NATO ultimatum 
and the [Serbs’] withdrawal to a distance of 20 kilometres. 245 
 
End game 
By the end of 1995, the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was coming to an end. The alliance 
of Bosnian and Croatian forces, with international support, had dramatically changed the 
situation on the ground.246 The brutal massacre of more than 7000 Muslims at Srebrenica 
had changed the position of the United States into full-scale support of the Croats.247 The 
objective was to redress the military balance in advance of peace negotiations, and Franjo 
Tuman consulted the US on how far the Croatian forces should go in the offensive.248 
For the Serbs in Croatia, the consequences were grave. Miloševi had used the Politika 
newspaper to try to force the Krajina leaders into agreeing to a deal with Tuman, but 
had failed.249 In the summer of 1995, Tuman forces overran the self-proclaimed Serbian 
republic of Krajina in Operation Storm. The offensive lasted only a few days, and 
200,000 Serbs were forced to flee to Serbia. It was the final battle of a war which had 
started in Croatia in 1991. The operation effectively brought a more than 300 year-long 
Serbian presence in Croatia to an end, and the refugees accused Slobodan Miloševi of 
betraying the Croatian Serbs. 250 Arguably, this proved that the war in Croatia had come 
full circle, ending where it had started.  
 
A few months later, the warring parties were brought to the negotiation table on a US 
military base in Dayton, Ohio. In November, a final agreement was brokered, and 
hostilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina ended.251  
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Summary 
Spring 1993 saw a shift in Slobodan Miloševi public approach to the conflict in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. From denying Serb involvement in the war, he now publicly cut off 
relations with the Bosnian Serbs over their refusal to accept the Vance-Owen peace plan. 
His rhetoric suggests that the issue was just as much about personal loyalty as about his 
commitment to peace. Publicly, Miloševi thus contributed to portrayal of Republika 
Srpska as a pariah state, and said that he was willing to cut supply lines to the Bosnian 
Serbs.252 The war did not end, however, and the international community consequently 
did not lift the sanctions. Miloševi was not able to reap the economic benefits of his 
break with the Bosnian Serbs. Instead, he used the break as an opportunity to bolster his 
own image as the protector of the Serbia’s national interests. As examined, the Bosnian 
Serb leadership was sidelined and accused of letting their personal interest interfere with 
the interests of the Serbian nation. Miloševi even regarded the Bosnian Serbs as culprits, 
as they had refused to sign up to the peace plans which would end the sanctions against 
Serbia.  
 
The interest of the Serbian nation, Miloševi argued, was peace.253 Further, “genocidal 
sanctions” against the Serbs could be ended if a  peaceful settlement was accepted. 
Despite the fact that Miloševi failed to bring about peace, he could merge his position as 
a peacemaker, with the role as the undisputed leader of the Serbian fight against 
sanctions.  
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Conclusion 
The dynamic relationship between the Serbs in Serbia and those living in the 
neighbouring republics is of key importance to any study of the wars of independence in 
the former Yugoslavia. As I have argued in chapter one, a shared sense of threat against 
all Serbs re-emerged in the speeches of Serbian president Slobodan Miloševi in 1991. 
This was a legacy of genocide, which formed an important part of the Belgrade regime’s 
propaganda machinery.  
 
I have analysed this legacy as a rhetorical device in president Slobodan Miloševi’s most 
important speeches and public addresses from 1991 to 1995. One of the key factors in my 
study has been to look at the purpose it served for the Miloševi regime. It seems obvious 
that the spectre of genocide was a powerful tool for a regime that mobilised its people to 
war on a nationalist platform. But this thesis has shown that its use was not confined to a 
setting of war and expansionism.   
 
The genocide legacy was deeply rooted in the Serbian nation’s historical memory from 
the Middle Ages, and particularly myths emerging from the Battle of Kosovo in 1389. 
Together with the memories of the slaughter of Serbs during the Second World War, it 
constitutes a legacy of genocide. This legacy was suppressed in Tito’s Yugoslavia, and 
was considered an expression of unacceptable nationalism. With the death of Tito, 
however, a nationalist re-orientation gradually supplanted an enforced multi-national 
identity. The Serbs Academy of Arts and Sciences (SANU) in 1986 published the 
Memorandum, which lamented a return of genocide facing the Serbian nation in Kosovo. 
Although the Memorandum was meant to be a secret document, it was leaked and 
dramatically brought the subject of genocide onto the Serbian public domain.254 
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The re-emergence of national myths in Serbia gave the legacy of genocide a new political 
meaning. Slobodan Miloševi realised its value as a propaganda tool which could rally 
the people in his quest for power. Perhaps unwittingly, his words “no one shall dare to 
beat you” to a group of Serbian demonstrators in Kosovo Polje in 1987 struck a chord 
with the Serbian population.255 It also became a central ingredient in his so-called “anti-
bureaucratic revolution”.256  
 
It is perhaps unsurprising that the legacy of genocide gained a prominent place in 
Miloševi’s propaganda machinery as the republics in the former Yugoslavia slid into 
brutal wars of independence. In a non-totalitarian state a government at war would need 
to convince its people that the war is just, and worth fighting. 257 As this thesis has shown, 
Miloševi exploited the genocide legacy in Croatia. He referred to the concrete memories 
of the Ustaša-led massacres against the Serbs during the Second World War, and warned 
dramatically that the “ghost of fascism was knocking on the door”.258   
 
Still, the legacy of genocide in Miloševi’s propaganda was not limited to a mobilisation 
drive for a war against an enemy nation. Miloševi rather used this rhetorical tool as he 
saw it fit. Moreover, he could denounce nationalism when this was politically expedient, 
and pledge to preserve Yugoslavia that still held a strong support with the electorate in 
Serbia. Simultaneously, he was deeply involved with creating conditions for war. 
Evidence from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has shown 
that Miloševi had a firm hand in arming and providing military support for the Serbs in 
both Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.259  
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But the war was never put to a vote in Serbia. Although he had undoubtedly come to 
power on a nationalist platform, he did not aim to portray himself as a warmonger. In 
fact, in August 1991, 78 per cent of Serbs said in a survey that they favoured keeping 
peace at all costs.260 Undoubtedly aware of this, Miloševi responded by embarking on a 
rhetoric of peace. This became a central part of his propaganda during the war in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.  
 
He argued that the Serbian leadership was doing its outmost to restore peace, which 
would preserve Yugoslavia. At the same time, he denied links with the armed forces in 
Republika Srpska, and even described the war as absurd. This happened at the same time 
that the Bosnian Serb leadership used the legacy of genocide to stir up hatred against the 
Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Reportedly, they used the higher birth rate of Bosnian 
Muslims, which they believed constituted genocide against the Bosnian Serbs, as a 
justification for the use of mass rapes.261 Slobodan Miloševi on the other hand chose a 
very different approach. In his public addresses, he preached tolerance and actively 
promoted himself as a man who could reach out to Muslims. A possible explanation for 
this could simply be that Miloševi attempted to strike a chord with the population, aware 
that war mongering was not popular in Serbia.  
 
This did not mean, however, that he abandoned the legacy of genocide. It was only the 
image of the perpetrators of genocide that shifted. Arguably, it was impossible to argue 
that military adversaries in Bosnia-Herzegovina were perpetrating genocide against 
Serbs, when Miloševi at the same time denied any knowledge of the concrete actions on 
the ground. In contrast to the war in Croatia, the Bosnian war was not legitimised through 
Miloševi’s genocide rhetoric. Neither was the military enemy on the ground in the 
Bosnian War demonised as perpetrators of genocide against the Serbs. Miloševi’s public 
focus was on achieving peace. It was arguably not in Miloševi interest to use the legacy 
of genocide in concert with the Bosnian Serbs.  
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From 1993, Serbia publicly broke off its relationship with the Bosnian Serbs, starting 
with the rejection of the Vance-Owen peace plan. After the split, Miloševi lashed out 
against the Bosnian Serb leaders, and accused them of disloyalty and of ignoring the 
interests of Serbia. At the same time, he accused the international community of 
genocidal sanctions against the civilian population in Serbia.262 This shift shows the 
flexibility of sanctions as a propaganda tool for Miloševi. It is also an indication of the 
highly political charge which this legacy carried in Serbia. By linking national interests to 
his attempts to have the sanctions lifted, he could argue that the disloyal acts of the 
Bosnian Serbs effectively went against the interests of the Serbian people. By interests, 
he arguably meant the lifting of genocidal sanctions.  
 
As such, the references to genocide in Miloševi’s propaganda transcended a traditional 
nationalist framework in which myths were lifted onto the political platform in order to 
fuel ethnic hostilities. Its purpose was not uniquely to rally the population to war against 
an outside threat. Genocide also formed part of Miloševi’s attempts to rally the Serbs 
behind a peace deal that would end the genocidal UN sanctions against Serbia. 
 
This thesis has approached conflict analysis through a focus on historical events used in a 
modern propaganda setting. It has shown the political charge within the concept of 
genocide, and how its flexible use made it possible to adapt it to the current interest of a 
leader at war. Further reflections can be made on the steps leading to war, and 
Miloševi’s motives for provoking conflict in Croatia. Similarly, it is my belief that the 
gap between Miloševi actions on the ground and his peace rhetoric in the war Bosnia-
Herzegovina will be a key field of analysis in the years to come.  
 
It is my hope that this study can be a small contribution to the study of the propaganda 
machinery of Slobodan Miloševi. At the time of writing, Europe is confronted with the 
challenge of finding a solution to Kosovo’s future status. Serbia, supported by Russia, is 
sharply opposed to granting independence to the province. At the same time, the Serbs of 
Kosovo are threatening to form their own state if Kosovo seeks recognition. That will 
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undoubtedly bring the legacy of genocide against the Serbs back to the front pages. After 
all, it was in Kosovo, which Serbs call their historic homeland, that the genocide myth 
was born. It is also here that it is likely to once again re-emerge. 
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